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ABSTRACT 
 
During the Second World War, over 120,000 Japanese American citizens were held in intern-
ment for much of the conflict.  The United States government supported this action by claiming 
military necessity required removal of all West Coast Japanese Americans as a national security 
threat.  However, this process had little to do with military necessity and was set in motion dec-
ades before by the rhetoric of the anti-Japanese movement, which through numerous works out-
lined Japanese Americans as a military threat.  This thesis, through review of significant pub-
lished documents, argues that a multitude of writers representing a wide array of Americans sup-
ported this concept and actively presented Japanese Americans to be a military threat.  Together, 
this movement set the needed preconditions for eventual mass military internment. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 In early 1942, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9066, requir-
ing thousands of American citizens of Japanese descent to evacuate the western seaboard of the 
United States and into eventual mass internment.  Today, this act is generally described as a blot 
on the history of the United States, a clear assault on the civil liberties of citizens based primarily 
on race.  The official United States Congressional report on the affair, compiled between 1982 
and 1983, Personal Justice Denied, noted the events were a result of “race prejudice, war hyste-
ria, and a failure of political leadership.”1  There is no doubt that racism played a substantial role 
in acceptance of Japanese American internment; hostility towards Japanese Americans in the 
United States was widespread before the Second World War.  Yet, this anti-Japanese racism en-
compassed something more than just prejudice of cultural and physical differences; it reflected 
an underlying fear of losing social and political hierarchy.  Further, the way in which this preju-
dice was defined during the period before the Second World War sought to classify Japanese 
Americans as a legitimate military threat separate from other Asian races prominent in the 
United States, such as Chinese or Filipino.  The anti-Japanese movement argued that the Japa-
nese race’s connection internationally to Imperial Japan equated to their disloyalty domestically.  
Various writers, columnists, politicians and generals alike identified this threat in Japanese immi-
grants and their children and demonstrated a desire to impede its believed menace through mili-
tary intervention.  Together, this wide reaching assortment of commentators became the anti-Jap-
anese movement.  Through their presentation of Japanese Americans as national security threats, 
                                                 
1 Personal Justice Denied: Report of the Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of 
Civilians. (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1982), 18. 
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the anti-Japanese movement was able to encourage a militaristic response to their concerns by 
popularizing their view of Japanese Americans.   
 When Executive Order 9066 was signed in February of 1942, the extraordinary actions it 
allowed for were described as necessary for national defense and backed by a litany of important 
individuals who, over the course of many years, had invented a sinister Japanese American plot 
against the United States.  This movement capitalized on publications that intentionally associ-
ated Japanese Americans with military action creating a consensus view within the anti-Japanese 
community.  It also attempted to establish an idea within American society as a whole which 
identified Japanese Americans as a threat.  By the time of the Pearl Harbor attack, the idea of a 
‘peaceful’ Japanese ‘invasion’ had long since slipped into the national subconscious, while the 
concept of the Japanese fifth column highlighted the concerns regarding Japanese Americans in 
1941.2  The efforts of these individuals to cast Japanese Americans as an invasion-in-waiting de-
serves additional examination as a cause of mass Japanese American internment.  The anti-Japa-
nese movement’s efforts were designed to influence American politics, foreign policy and popu-
lar opinion and were ultimately used by United States government in support of anti-Japanese 
goals.  In short, the history of the anti-Japanese movement, or ‘Japanese problem,’ between 1868 
and 1941 shows a consistent and unwavering racial connection between Japanese Americans and 
the military expansions of Imperial Japan, which allowed for the anti-Japanese movement to pre-
sent Japanese immigrants and Japanese Americans as a military threat.  
 This paper reviews Japanese American internment during the Second World War as a 
product of long term anti-Japanese rhetoric intent on defining Japanese Americans, as a race, as a 
                                                 
2 Cornelius Vanderbilt Jr., The Verdict of Public Opinion on the Japanese-American Question. 
(New York: Privately Printed by Cornelius Vanderbilt, Jr., 1921), 12, 16, 18, 20, 22, 23, 24, 25, 
28, 32, 33, 44, 46, 51. 
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hostile threat to national security.  Although not a formal association, the anti-Japanese move-
ment included numerous organizations and individuals intent on informing and dictating change 
toward Japanese Americans and helped cultivate continued anti-Japanese oppression.  The pri-
mary focus of their argument was that Japanese Americans posed a military threat and therefore 
had to be dealt with under the same pretense.  A significant part of the paper is devoted to ana-
lyzing the presumed racial differences between Japanese and other Asian races to identify how 
Executive Order 9066 separated ‘yellow peril’ from the ‘Japanese problem’ and why the latter 
term better describes the racism faced by Japanese Americans.  In addition, as anti-Japanese rhet-
oric placed emphasis on the military necessity as a means to resist what they believed to be Japa-
nese American concerns, it is important to review the validity of those claims.  Through exami-
nation of the link between the anti-Japanese movement’s push to associate Japanese Americans 
with military necessity and the eventual government argument for military confinement, the ba-
sis of racial issues becomes transparent.   
 
‘Yellow Peril’ and the ‘Japanese Problem’ 
 The idea of ‘yellow peril’ looms large in the discussion on Japanese internment during 
World War II.  Originally coined by German Kaiser Wilhelm II, the term reflected on the grow-
ing fear the Western or ‘white’ world had in the increased predominance of the Asian or ‘yellow’ 
races.”3  In many ways ‘yellow peril’ included all Asians, from Pacific Islanders to Chinese and 
                                                 
3 Hugh H. Lusk, "The Real Yellow Peril,” The North American Review 186, no. 624 (1907): 375. 
It is important to comment on the terms ‘race’ and ‘white’ here.  Ideas of race are culturally de-
fined and therefore fluid in, as seen with ‘yellow races’ changing over time to fit the understand-
ing of ‘peril.’  The same is true for ‘white’ Americans.  For this text, ‘white’ refers to the Euro-
American view of generally Western European male majority within the United States that has 
become consensus American history. 
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Japanese, as a means to incorporate anyone that posed an assumed ‘peril.’  However, it extended 
further by combining all Asians as ‘yellow,’ allowing for them to be seen in purely racial terms 
and not as individuals or even separate national groupings.  At its core the term understood 
Asians as an undefined and unidentifiable mass that could be presumed a single color; it was pur-
posely ambiguous.  For the United States, ‘yellow peril’ focused on some of the first Asian races 
to migrate in large numbers to the nation including Filipinos, Chinese and Japanese.  Far from 
novel, this racist idea mixed misconception with cultural differences to term the Asian races a 
concern to the then dominant Eurocentric world.4  Historian Erika Lee notes that Asian ‘yellow 
peril’ in the eyes of Americans “were described as being unassimilable aliens who brought eco-
nomic competition, disease, and immorality.”5  The United States in particular saw the growth of 
Sinophobia with the expansion of Asian immigration.  Seen as a potential impediment to the 
American destiny, the perceived combined Asian race, whether it be Chinese, Korean or Japa-
nese, threatened the balance of American harmony.6  Another historian, John Dower, notes that 
‘yellow peril’ was intrinsically based on race, that “the vision of the menace from the East was 
always more racial rather than national.  It derived not from concern with any one country or 
people in particular, but from a vague and ominous sense of the vast, faceless, nameless yellow 
horde: the rising tide, indeed, of color.”7  ‘Yellow peril’ certainly was understood as the threat of 
the outsider, the racially different and presumably dangerous “yellow horde.”  The Asian race 
                                                 
4 Gary Y. Okihiro, Cane Fires: The Anti-Japanese Movement in Hawaii, 1865-1945 (Philadel-
phia: Temple University Press, 1991), 84-88. 
5 Erika Lee, "The “Yellow Peril” and Asian Exclusion in the Americas,” Pacific Historical Re-
view 76, no. 4 (2007): 537. 
6 Ibid, 537-539. 
7 John W. Dower, War Without Mercy: Race & Power in the Pacific War (New York: Pantheon 
Books, 1986), 156. 
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was competition to the prevailing ideas of Western civilization economically, culturally and mili-
tarily. 
 The generally accepted concept of race prejudice relating to Japanese American intern-
ment stems from this terminology ‘yellow peril.’  The study of ‘yellow peril’ has developed sub-
stantially over time and remains an important concept linking anti-Asian racism with anti-Japa-
nese racism.  It is not an all-encompassing term however, and it cannot fully explain Japanese 
internment because it fails to address how the anti-Japanese movement differs from that of other 
peoples, historically, and problematically, described as ‘yellow races.’  The perceived interna-
tional relationship that existed between Imperial Japan and its citizens living abroad helps con-
nect the specific racism faced by Japanese immigrants and Japanese Americans.  The ideas are 
interconnected but important to differentiate as only together can the full racial prejudice toward 
Japanese be understood.  ‘Yellow peril’ is too broad when examining Japanese American intern-
ment as the act separated Japanese from the larger group.  It combined the racial identifiers 
prominent in ‘yellow peril’ with an Eurocentric understanding of nationalism with Japan.  The 
Euro-American ideas of imperialism and nationalism merged to present Japanese different than 
others of the Asian continent. 
 The ‘Japanese problem’ then accepts the racial fears of ‘yellow peril’ but also includes 
nationalistic viewpoints unique to Imperial Japan.  Whereas ‘yellow peril’ certainly crossed in-
ternational borders - the concept exists in large part due to the fear of Asian transnational mobil-
ity - it does not fully show how a powerful Japanese state reflected on the perception of Japanese 
people.  When reviewing the presumed threat Imperial Japan had to ‘white’ homogeny, there is a 
different view of Japanese immigrants separate from other Asian races.  This variation to the 
broad ‘yellow peril’ terminology better describes the ‘Japanese problem’ by incorporating race 
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concerns but also understanding how nationalism played a role.  The ‘Japanese problem,’ 
through this vital difference, created a more militaristic stance toward Japanese immigrants and 
Japanese Americans.  Connected through both race and Imperial Japan, the Japanese people were 
elevated to a significant national security concern. 
 
The Anti-Japanese Movement 
 The anti-Japanese movement promoted a strong connection between Japanese and mili-
tary concerns.  Literature between 1900 and 1940 confirms a significant faction within the 
United States who supported the connection between Japanese immigrants and Japanese Ameri-
cans to military threats.  This group formed a consensus opinion of Japanese which deemed them 
a national security threat.  More so, this faction strongly argued that it was a movement of the 
people of the West Coast.  In 1909, media baron John P. Young wrote:  
 
 
 
The recital of these facts ought to warn the Eastern critics of the anti-Japanese immigra-
tion movement on this coast that they may be in error in assuming that the attitude of the 
Pacific Coast on the subject has been inspired by labor agitators, and that the demand for 
exclusion does not represent the sentiment of all classes in California and of the other 
states on the Pacific Coast.  As a matter of fact, such an assumption is wholly erroneous.8   
 
 
 
Despite Young’s self-serving comments as an anti-Japanese publisher who profited on anti-Japa-
nese sentiment, this paper supports there was indeed a strong consensus on the ‘Japanese prob-
lem.’  From the early 1900s to early 1930s, Japanese living in the United States were described 
as a direct military threat; that is to say, they were classified as a risk of ‘invasion.’  The believed 
                                                 
8 John P. Young, "The Support of the Anti-Oriental Movement,” The Annals of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science 34, no. 2 (1909): 232. 
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strong connection between Imperial Japan and Japanese globally assumed their citizens embod-
ied the imperialistic views and attitudes of the Japanese nation.  As argued by Brian Hayashi, 
Japanese racial and cultural connections to Japan were rarely disputed or differentiated, resulting 
in the belief that Japanese loyalty stemmed directly from their race alone.9   As Imperial Japan 
was considered by many opposed to Japanese expansion to be a direct military threat well before 
conflict actually occurred, the Japanese people, even internationally, were considered racially 
alike and constituted the same threat of ‘invasion.’   
 Many within the anti-Japanese movement then focused their prejudice on the racial dif-
ferences between white Americans and Japanese immigrants and their inability to coexist.  The 
Japanese, they insisted, were unable to assimilate to the American way of life understood by 
white homogeny.  California Senator James Phelan in 1900 claimed, “Japanese are not bona fide 
citizens.  They are not the stuff of which American citizens can be made…Personally we have 
nothing against Japanese, but as they will not assimilate with us and their social life is so differ-
ent from ours, let them keep at a respectful distance.”10  Those like Phelan believed the inability 
of Japanese immigrants to assimilate to the American way of life stemmed from their connection 
to Imperial Japan.  Not only were the religious, social and economic methods of the Japanese en-
tirely incompatible with white Americans, Japanese as a group, no matter location, had an unwa-
vering connection to Imperial Japan and its ultimate leader, the Emperor; “Politically immature, 
                                                 
9 Brian Masaru Hayashi, Democratizing The Enemy: The Japanese American Internment 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), 16.  
10 Roger Daniels, The Politics of Prejudice: The Anti-Japanese Movement in California and the 
Struggle for Japanese Exclusion. (Los Angeles: University of California Press), 1962, 21. 
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trained in docile obedience, and tied to the ‘divine’ Emperor by all the ties of tradition and reli-
gion.”11  As a people and a race, even if American-born, they were innately Japanese without ex-
ception.  Their presence in the United States constituted an attack on the established social order. 
 The racial bond that connected Japanese in Imperial Japan with those in the United States 
quickly morphed into a military concern.  General John L. DeWitt, the infamous American mili-
tary commander of Western Defense Command that advocated for and oversaw the Japanese 
American evacuation, noted his opinion on the Japanese American connection to their ancestral 
homeland, “A Jap’s a Jap.  It makes no difference whether he is an American citizen or 
not…Theoretically, he is still a Japanese and you can’t change him.  You can’t change him by 
giving him a piece of paper.”12   Japanese Americans, in the eyes of the man in charge of the de-
fense of the Western United States, General DeWitt, were the enemy based solely on race.  Japa-
nese Americans by nature could not be loyal subjects to the United States.  Whereas other ethnic 
groups like German Americans had similar racial and cultural heritage with the Nazi Germany 
enemy, the prejudice directed at them differed from that of Japanese Americans who were unable 
to disassociate from Imperial Japan.  The ‘Japanese problem,’ as a long held and unrelenting 
opinion, opened the door to action in the form of internment.  The anti-Japanese movement put 
forth numerous works denoting the extreme risk of Japanese Americans to national security. 
 This fear of Japanese Americans can be seen in the writing of Peter Bernard Kyne of San 
Francisco.  Relatively unknown today, Peter Bernard Kyne wrote the book, The Pride of Palo-
mar (1921).  Published in several editions of Cosmopolitan Magazine and then later adapted into 
                                                 
11 Otto D. Tolischus, Tokyo Record (New York: Reynal & Hitchcock, 1943), 77. 
12 Okihiro, 92. 
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a silent film, the fictional story is presented as absolute fact and attempts to convey the true na-
ture and danger of the ‘Japanese problem.’  Further, through efforts of the main characters, the 
text attempts to confirm the strong anti-Japanese consensus of the American West Coast.  The 
fictional work spearheads the racial arguments of the anti-Japanese movement by showing how 
Japanese Americans were negatively affecting natural born white Americans.  The story’s hero, 
Don Miguel Farrel, a handsome, educated American solider and Congressional Medal of Honor 
recipient, returns home to his family estate in Southern California to find his land on the verge of 
purchase by a Japanese man.  Farrel philosophically educates the other whites to the peril of the 
Japanese; “They feel that they have as much right in North America as we have, and they pro-
pose over-running us and making our country Japanese territory.”13  The hero, the celebrated son 
of Palomar, is confirmed in his stance on Japanese Americans when the Japanese antagonist 
Okada attempts to assassinate him so that he can gain ownership of the land.  Yet the Celtic-
Spaniard Farell is wise to the treachery of the Japanese American and foils the plot sending the 
duplicitous man out of his community.  The tale ends happily as Farell marries the story’s love 
interest and they live on the land together free of the ‘Japanese problem.’ 
 Despite the fictional nature of the story, there is no doubt about the author’s desire to ed-
ucate the reader and promote anti-Japanese rhetoric.  Even after Okada had retreated from the 
story, Farrel attempts to demonstrate the inability of Japanese Americans to part ways with their 
Japanese heritage.  Through conversation with a white school teacher in a majority Japanese 
American area, the reader discovered this continued connection:  
 
 
 
                                                 
13 Peter B. Kyne, The Pride of Palomar (New York: Cosmopolitan Book Corporation, 1921), 74. 
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She pointed to a brown house half a mile away.  Over it flew the flag of Japan.  “They 
learn ancestor worship and to cow-tow to the Emperor’s picture down there, after they 
have attended school here…After they have learned here that Columbus discovered 
America on October 12th, 1492, they proceed to that Japanese school and are taught that 
the Mikado is a divinity and a direct descendant of the Sun God…The Buddhist school 
over yonder is teaching them to be Japanese citizens; under Japanese law all Japanese re-
main Japanese citizens at heart, even if they do occasionally vote here.”14  
 
 
 
The quote clearly defines the loyalty of the ‘invading’ Japanese.  Not only do the children con-
tinue to worship the Emperor and learn about their Japanese citizenship, they do so under the 
flag of Imperial Japan.  The Pride of Palomar appealed to its reader that the racial prejudice of 
the book’s characters were a product of necessity and not racism.  National security dictated a 
response as Japanese were all like Okada, willing to kill for the land of white men.  Without the 
reader’s actions, without national actions, the state of California and the entire Pacific coast 
would be overwhelmed by the Japanese ‘invasion.’  
 The Pride of Palomar formed the basis of a 1921 survey compiled by Cornelius Vander-
bilt Jr. entitled “The Verdict of Public Opinion on the Japanese-American Question” (1921).  
The piece made an effort to amass opinions from some of the more prominent individuals in the 
United States including writers, university presidents, elected officials and members of the me-
dia.  So significant an issue were Japanese immigrants, felt Vanderbilt Jr, that the most important 
citizens from across the nation needed to be involved to solve it.  The Pride of Palomar being 
published in a national publication allowed many to confront the ‘issue’ for the first time.  The 
introduction by Vanderbilt Jr. stated that:  
 
 
 
                                                 
14 Ibid, 185-186. 
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America needs constructive statesmanship in international affairs”…“This symposium 
was gathered in the hope of giving the American people the unbiased outlook of Japa-
nese-American relations as they are today.  In presenting a cross-section of the public 
opinion of important leaders in public affairs, we have tried to develop a guide towards 
better relations and better understands of the two races.15 
 
 
 
The majority opinion found an issue with the continued immigration of Japanese and several in-
terviewed coined it an ‘invasion.’  The term ‘invasion’ was common within Vanderbilt Jr.’s book 
but not unique.  The opinions received, from the American ‘cross-section’ as he states, were in-
deed varied but confirmed the very concerning nature of the discussion.  Even twenty years be-
fore war broke out between Imperial Japan and the United States, anti-Japanese racism had at-
tracted national attention and a significant consensus had begun on how to stop the Japanese 
American ‘invasion.’  Books like that of Peter Kyne illuminated what Vanderbilt Jr. believed to 
be a pressing national concern and Vanderbilt Jr.’s text confirms Kyne and himself were among 
many prominent individuals that favored a strong solution to the growing ‘Japanese problem.’ 
 
Japanese Americans: From ‘Invasion’ to ‘Fifth Column’ 
 Concerns over growth of the ‘Japanese American problem' persisted through the 1920s 
into the 1930s.  Closer to the 1930s and 1940s however, a shift occurred in the consensus opin-
ion, which found Japanese immigrants and Japanese Americans were more likely to assist Impe-
rial Japan as fifth columnists.  Although still believed to be a serious threat to the United States, 
Japanese Americans were expected to become saboteurs and spies.   As saboteurs or spies, Japa-
nese living in the United States, according to the diverse anti-Japanese circle, were understood to 
be a continued concern.  Despite this shift in perceived method of attack, Japanese immigrants 
                                                 
15 Vanderbilt Jr., 5. 
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and Japanese Americans remained the center of military concern within the American Pacific 
realm.   At no point from 1900 to 1941 were Japanese Americans not presumed to be a national 
security threat in the minds of anti-Japanese critics.  Mass Japanese American internment hinged 
on the argument of military necessity.  The foundation of the United States’ case of military need 
against Japanese ultimately relied on the interconnectedness of their race with loyalty.   
 Numerous historians have commented on this change in Japanese American threat as per-
ceived by the American government, including Brian Hayashi.  By 1931, Hayashi claims, the 
United States military intelligence community no longer feared Japanese ‘invasion’ and that the 
precondition of race influencing military action no longer applied.16  Public fascination with as-
sumed Japanese American disloyalty remained strong, however the military no longer antici-
pated Japanese Americans to be a security risk.17  In fact, Hayashi states, that any expectation of 
‘invasion’ no longer existed in any form and that the few remaining holdouts saw only minor 
Japanese American fifth column potential.  Hayashi is correct in noting the change between ideas 
of ‘invasion' and that of the fifth column, a term derived from the Spanish Civil War referring to 
individuals within a state supportive of an external force.  Yet, his confidence in the United 
States military intelligence community lacking fear of Japanese Americans, whether viewed 
from the point of ‘invasion’ or fifth column, misses the point.  Even if the assumed threat shifted, 
Japanese Americans during the 1930s constituted a significant military threat in the minds of 
many within the military community as well as the broader public.  A 1933 report confirms 
Hayashi’s belief that fifth column activity was more plausible than Japanese Americans arming 
                                                 
16 Brian Masaru Hayashi, “Kilsoo Haan, American Intelligence, and the Anticipated Japanese In-
vasion of California, 1931-1943,” Pacific Historical Review 83, no. 2 (2014): 285-286. 
17 Ibid. 
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themselves as combatants, but it also stresses Japanese Americans remained a major concern to 
the Hawaiian islands; a concept strong enough to affect the positioning of aircraft right before 
the Pearl Harbor attack in a manner designed to avoid sabotage, not aerial attack.18 
 
The Question of Military Necessity 
 All told, internment took almost 120,000 American citizens away from their lives, plac-
ing them in camps as far away from the West Coast as Arkansas.19  These individuals were not 
charged with a crime or presented with evidence of their disloyalty but instead were assumed 
guilty of intent to undermine or destroy the United States.  Their crime was their assumed treach-
erous heritage, not their individual actions.  At the time of the presidential action, however, the 
response taken by the government was described as necessary for national defense.  Even still, 
there remain those that maintain fifth column activity was a paramount risk to national security 
due to the threat of Imperial Japanese military invasion and the potential reaction of Japanese 
Americans to this.20  The fifth column threat encompassed numerous concerns focused on efforts 
of sabotage and espionage for the invading force by those loyal to their cause.  One such critic, 
former National Security Agency officer David Lowman, in his book Magic: The Untold Story 
of the U.S. Intelligence and the Evacuation of Japanese Residents From the West Coast During 
WWII (2000), stated “Seldom has any major event in U.S. history been as misrepresented as has 
U.S. intelligence related to evacuation…The United States did not act shamefully, dishonorably, 
                                                 
18 Ibid, 165-172. 
Gordon W. Prange, At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor (New York: Penguin 
Books, 1981), 154-155. 
19 Personal Justice Denied, 3, 149. 
20 Francis MacDonnell, Insidious Foes: The Axis Fifth Column & the American Home Front 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 5. 
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and without cause or reason as charged.”21  The potential Japanese fifth columnists were be-
lieved to be active supporters of Imperial Japan and to have significant strength within the 
United States to not only encumber war efforts, but act as operatives in the event of Imperial Jap-
anese invasion.  As suggested by Lowman, this clear and obvious risk prompted uncommon yet 
necessary methods and fully outweighed the clear violation of citizen rights. This argument was 
also presented by the United States government in 1942 as the necessity behind internment.  So 
strong and likely was the potential of Japanese American treachery the government indicated, 
that evacuation and detainment set by racial lines allowed for military action. 
 General DeWitt made the United States government’s case for internment in his report, 
Final Report: Japanese Evacuation from the West Coast 1942 (1943).  The document indicated 
that the unbreakable connection between individuals of Japanese ancestry resulted in a clear and 
obvious threat to the nation.  Their concentration near military installations was far from coinci-
dental, their religion and deification of the Emperor of Imperial Japan were not benign, their con-
tinued education in the Japanese language and tradition was for ulterior motives.  The report 
‘confirmed’ to the American public that the Imperial Japanese government was utilizing the as-
sistance of Japanese Americans within the United States.  Further, the report noted that due to 
their inability to assimilate, Japanese Americans were impossibly difficult to differentiate, and 
they had to be assessed and detained as a group.  DeWitt stated in the report, “The evacuation 
was impelled by military necessity…The continued presence of a large, unassimilated, tightly 
knit racial group, bound to an enemy nation by strong ties of race, culture, custom and religion 
                                                 
21 David D. Lowman, Magic: The Untold Story of the U.S. Intelligence and the Evacuation of 
Japanese Residents From the West Coast During WWII (London: Athena Press, Inc., 2000), 3. 
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along a frontier vulnerable to attack constituted a menace which had to be dealt with.  Their loy-
alties were unknown and time was of the essence.”22  DeWitt’s report advised the American pub-
lic that Japanese Americans had actively participated in fifth column treason and were undenia-
bly a threat to security; “It, therefore, follows that along the vital Pacific Coast over 112,000 po-
tential enemies, of Japanese extraction, are at large today.”23  Without doubt, the report summa-
rized, Japanese Americans were disloyal and were a serious military threat to the Pacific conflict. 
 Introduced in mid 1943, the Final Report intended to confirm the government’s rationale 
for internment by focusing on the Japanese race as an enemy and hostile race.  It was the official 
document of Western Defense Command defending government action and was introduced well 
after the action had already taken place.  The goal of the document was to reinforce the war time 
requirements of internment and to stress the inability to verify friend from foe.  At the time of its 
official release in June 1943, continued internment of Japanese Americans was being challenged 
in the courts and the government was fearful that a judgement in favor of Japanese Americans 
could dissolve mass internment, thus questioning the idea of military necessity entirely.  The Fi-
nal Report became the cornerstone of the government’s case written by the military commander 
who ordered the action.  Instead of verifying a legitimate stance of military need, it confirmed 
racism to be the central theme of internment.  In an effort to prove military necessity it empha-
sized race and the result was a prejudice driven document that could not utilize facts to prove its 
point.  Examination of the Final Report is vital to understanding internment because it shows 
both the racial and nationalistic identifiers commonly associated with Japanese Americans.  It 
also demonstrates the weakness of the military necessity concept it attempted to support.  These 
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two notions, the identification of the ‘Japanese problem’ related to military necessity along with 
the question if national security required internment, represent the argument of this paper. 
 Advocates of internment cite both the Niihau incident and the Magic code breaking as 
validation of the claim that Japanese Americans were a legitimate threat to the United States.  
The Niihau Incident, they claim, confirms that Japanese racial ties were stronger than were ties 
to American values prompting the only Japanese on the island to collaborate in Japanese military 
efforts.  Similarly, Magic code breaking offered a glimpse into the desires of Imperial Japan, 
which advocates indicate supports a broad aim to utilize any and all Japanese Americans in fifth 
column activities.  Although a tightly guarded military secret, internment advocates have argued 
that Magic supported the necessity of mass internment of Japanese as it confirmed the inability 
to differentiate between loyal and disloyal Japanese.  Niihau likewise, so claimed supporters of 
military necessity, demonstrated loyalty could not be expected and for all intents and purposes 
was likely to come down to race. 
 The concept of military necessity became the official basis for the United States’ intern-
ment of Japanese Americans in early 1942.  The United States military and elected government 
presented this connection between national security and the ‘Japanese problem’ declaring intern-
ment the only reasonable solution.  General DeWitt overstated connections between Japanese 
Americans and naval losses off the West Coast,24 while Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox 
aligned Imperial Japanese Naval success at Pearl Harbor with Japanese American fifth column 
activity25 as well.  Emphasis was first placed on the potential threat Japanese Americans had on 
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the American war effort as a measure of avoiding the obvious racial considerations that came 
with singling out a small racial minority.  Despite these efforts, Executive Order 9066 vilified 
Japanese Americans for their race and not their potential national security risk.  Even more trans-
parent is General DeWitt’s Final Report, whose inescapable theme cannot disconnect race and 
security.  Consistently, DeWitt focuses on suspected or claimed Japanese American fifth column 
activity by connecting Japanese Americans to Imperial Japan or Japanese cultural heritage.  
These connections he claims are unavoidable as a racial marker and are so prevalent and indistin-
guishable between individuals that the entire race on American soil had to be seen as a threat 
controllable only through internment.  Further, as aptly demonstrated by Historian Eric Muller, 
military necessity drew from the presumed disloyalty of Japanese opposed to substantiated 
fact.26  The concept of military necessity has more connection to racism than substantial military 
need and this continued consensus informed the decisions of American leadership on internment.  
Simply put, the conditions for military internment did not exist. 
 Lowman’s argument, like that of DeWitt’s before, falls short of the historic complexity of 
internment.  Both men centered their reasoning on specific evidence, which they claimed sup-
ported that an unparalleled action was needed to protect the delicate military situation of early 
1942.  That only through broad military authority could the threat of Japanese Americans be 
averted.  The arguments of DeWitt and Lowman suggested that Japanese Americans were the en-
emy and their submission, through military means, was required to deprive the Imperial Japanese 
state of a weapon of war.  Their unassimilable nature and inability to be seen as individuals re-
                                                 
2626 Eric L. Muller, American Inquisition: The Hunt for Japanese American Disloyalty in World 
War II (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2007), 5. 
  18 
quired that all Japanese Americans faced the same compulsory treatment. Inevitably, their evi-
dence is too narrow, at times outright incorrect and ultimately unable to encapsulate the multi-
tude of factors involved.  As correctly stated by historian Rodger Daniels, “the evacuation of 
1942 did not occur in a vacuum.”27  There was not a single motivational factor in this act, just as 
military necessity cannot effectively excuse away the executive order.  Careful examination of 
documents in the decades connecting the start of Japanese immigration to the attack on Pearl 
Harbor dispute the need for military necessity.  Beyond that, this concept of military necessity 
for the ‘Japanese problem’ was invented through numerous works by the anti-Japanese move-
ment intent to prove the Japanese race as hostile to the national interests of the United States. 
This study then attempts to illuminate how continual efforts in politics, the media and within the 
military from this anti-Japanese community helped lead to mass internment after the Pearl Har-
bor attack. 
 The argument of this paper is not that every Japanese American was loyal or had undi-
luted patriotism to the United States.  This parameter is also far too complacent and simplistic.  
Although Japanese Americans were by and large aligned with American interests, Magic mes-
sages show that Imperial Japan had the intention of bringing conflict to American shores and to 
utilize any resource possible to promote fifth column activity.28  The issue is not on the individ-
ual level but rather with the governmental assumption that race alone was a factor in loy-
alty.  Mass internment verifies this was the causation, not military need.  The treatment of Japa-
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nese Americans in Hawaii during the Second World War demonstrates a departure from pure ra-
cial discrimination and confirms the lack of wholesale Japanese American fifth column activity.  
The emphasis placed on individual internment over mass internment highlighted the stark differ-
ence between the mainland United States and the territory of Hawaii, but also the over emphasis 
of military necessity.  A second study into Nazi Germany’s fifth column threats in the United 
States further illustrates that Germany, not Japan, had more potential in this field and demanded 
greater concern than that of Imperial Japan.29  Between successful fifth column activity during 
the First World War, popular Nazi American movements and espionage networks and operatives 
working within American borders, Germany better defined the ‘Japanese problem’ notwithstand-
ing the obvious racial disconnect between the two. 
 Aside from the connection between racism and the ‘Japanese problem,’ the idea of mili-
tary necessity remains a hollow facade.  The argument in and of itself, when seen in conjunction 
with the evidence supplied by the government, produces little to substantiate a connection be-
tween Japanese Americans and national security.  So underwhelming was the evidence and ac-
tions of Japanese Americans after internment that California Attorney General Earl Warren 
claimed the lack of anti-American activity by Japanese Americans itself as proof of nefarious in-
tent.30  In fact, the evidence put forth by the government follows the course of those that pro-
moted ideas of Japanese racial harmonization internationally during the pre- Second World War 
twentieth century period.  These arguments attempt to connect Japanese nationalism, inability to 
assimilate and cultural associations with perceived fifth column activities.  DeWitt’s Final Re-
port categorically touches on all these points in an effort to link Japanese Americans to Japanese 
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nationalism, disloyalty, and even direct enemy military action.  Ultimately, his argument links 
the historical prose of the anti-Japanese movement with conflict in an attempt to devalue the 
clear racial motivations inherent in internment.  The consensus which formed to define the ‘Japa-
nese problem’ as racially driven further classified Japanese Americans as a military threat.  
 
Historiographic Review  
 The connections between race and Japanese American internment has been well studied 
as an understood focal point of the event.  Asian Americans as a whole were not detained as a 
result of Executive Order 9066, only Japanese Americans.  Race prejudice towards Japanese is 
often highlighted as the greatest cause of internment.  The idea has strong historical evidence as 
well as a clear academic following.  Long time historian on the anti-Asian movement, Roger 
Daniels, highlights the long running racist dialogue within the United States as a principle reason 
for internment in The Politics of Prejudice (1962).  Although an older text, The Politics of Preju-
dice remains a benchmark in discussing in detail how anti-Japanese prejudice was reflected in 
California politics.  His understanding of the topic, which merges the idea of race and culture to-
gether, saw the nation ripe with racist ‘yellow peril,’ allowing for a general lack of empathy for 
the plight of Japanese Americans at the time of internment.31  The Politics of Prejudice outlines 
the history of political racism within California through lobbying and anti-Japanese groups, 
which influenced politics as well as eventual military leadership.  Daniels defines ‘yellow peril’ 
to be the primary culprit of Japanese American internment and does not delineate ‘yellow peril’ 
from the ‘Japanese question.’  This point of view illustrates that all racism within the United 
States, whether against ‘red, yellow or black individuals,’ “were all part and parcel of the same 
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phenomenon.”32  Long standing racial fear through ‘yellow peril’ set the preconditions for in-
ternment according to Daniels, but the racism seen was not inherently different than racism 
against any other group. 
 Another historian, Gary Okihiro, built much of his argument on the connection between 
race and culture, as Daniels did.  Okihiro’s Cane Fires: The Anti-Japanese Movement in Hawaii, 
1865-1945 (1991) argues that the preexisting racist condition within the United States and the 
territory of Hawaii created the conditions for internment.  Further, he indicates that the views of 
political and cultural white leadership shared views and strategies similar to the military; more 
so, both the military and political leadership worked together in this regard.33  All of these preju-
diced views on the ‘Japanese problem’ created the idea of the ‘Japanese problem’ itself but also 
streamlined the narrative toward resolution of the issue through internment.  The ‘Japanese prob-
lem,’ according to Okihiro, was all encompassing to white homogeny thought, including culture, 
politics, economy as well as militarily.  Again, Okihiro postulates that race was the central ten-
ant, claiming “a kinship with the history of other minority groups in America.”34  Racism within 
the United States did not substantially differ between minority groups whether they be African 
American, Native American, or Japanese American. 
 Thus both Daniels and Okihiro focus on national issues of race as the central cause be-
hind internment.  The overarching theme of race blended with Japanese culture served to differ-
entiate and isolate Japanese immigrants and Japanese Americans from the rest of white Ameri-
can society.  Historian Brian Masaru Hayashi in “Kilsso Haan, American Intelligence, and the 
Anticipated Japanese Invasion of California, 1931-1943,” (2014) argues this understanding of 
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causation is incomplete.  He challenges the failure of Daniels and Okihiro to differentiate ‘yel-
low peril’ as a broad topic to the ‘Japanese problem.’  Racial prejudice alone fails to understand 
the development of military concerns towards Japanese Americans as a continuous and a con-
sistent threat.35  Hayashi argues that anti-Japanese prejudice has to be understood in a more 
global context with factors including geopolitical dynamics being observed.  “Race, culture and 
loyalty,” notes Hayashi, better identifies the causes of internment.36  Historian Greg Robinson 
also argues that the variance that made the ‘Japanese problem’ unique must be analyzed.  As 
such, he has approached Japanese American internment in a number of ways by reviewing politi-
cal leadership as well as studying internment as a phenomena exclusive not only to the United 
States.  In By Order of the President (2001), Robinson concentrates on how the federal govern-
ment under President Roosevelt allowed widespread race prejudice in conjunction with political 
disinterest to present Japanese Americans as an internal enemy.37  Although the book outlines 
the failures of Roosevelt's leadership as paramount in understanding internment, it identifies the 
undercurrent of race to be the primary contributor to internment.38  In A Tragedy of Democracy 
(2009), Robinson expands the concept of anti-Japanese prejudice as a North American event that 
included Latin America and Canada as well.  The importance of this work is the more global 
context of how the Japanese race was understood and how Japanese immigrants and their chil-
dren faced hostility throughout the continent.  Japanese prejudice in the United States was im-
mense, but not unique.  By reviewing this often missed aspect of the North American Japanese 
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experience, Robinson is able to show how racial fears and the depiction of Japanese nationalism 
demonstrated a threat understood outside of individual nations.39 
 In another text, Democratizing the Enemy: The Japanese American Internment (2004), 
Brian Hayashi again argues that singular focus on United States domestic issues cannot lead to a 
full understanding of Japanese American internment.  Race and wartime hysteria do not speak to 
the full context of events occurring outside of the United States.  Indeed, the third ‘cause’ of in-
ternment listed in Justice Denied, failure of political leadership, cannot account for the anti-Japa-
nese movement that existed across the Americas during this period.  Hayashi’s perspective deter-
mines that the relationship between ideas of race and culture which ‘determine’ loyalty were 
global.  Other historians as well have highlighted the inability to understand Japanese American 
internment as a strictly domestic affair.  Writers such as Eiichiro Azuma in “Japanese Immigrant 
Settler Colonialism in the U.S.-Mexican Borderlands and the U.S. Racial-Imperialist Politics of 
the Hemispheric ‘Yellow Peril’” (2014) and Erika Lee in “The ‘Yellow Peril’ and Asian Exclu-
sion in the Americas” (2007) further this concept.  All find that the changes in Japan and its in-
fluence within Asia factored greatly into the lives of Japanese immigrants within the Americas.  
The way in which they were perceived as a threat different than other Asians stems from Japa-
nese Imperialism.40  This further connected to military threats and dictated a response, or as 
Azuma notes, the establishment of a “national security regime” within the United States.41 
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Racism was not unique to the United States and the geopolitical relationships of the Pa-
cific greatly influenced the perception of Japanese immigrants globally.  This paper agrees, find-
ing a significant relationship between the strength and imperialistic growth of Imperial Japan 
with the image of Japanese Americans.  ‘Yellow peril’ helps preface the racist ideas confronting 
people of Asian descent within Western culture, yet it fails to grasp the differences in how Japa-
nese descendants were pictured.  Race, in addition to nationalistic viewpoints, allows for a fuller 
understanding of the interconnectedness of the ‘Japanese problem’ and eventual mass intern-
ment. 
 
Thesis Agenda 
 This paper attempts to explain two key points.  First, in Part I, how military necessity was 
perpetuated over the decades before World War II as the only true solution for the ‘Japanese 
problem’ based on a racial understanding of Japanese Americans.  Ideas of race and culture that 
bound Japanese Americans to Imperial Japan’s Pacific expansion and thus visualized them as a 
threat is vital to this understanding.  Although connected to the concept of ‘yellow peril,’ these 
significant differences were a precondition setting Japanese Americans on an individual level of 
risk associated with military conditions.  This section analyzes the works and commentaries of 
leading state, territorial and federal politicians, members of the media, Asian culture, military 
and history experts, as well as military leadership to explain the growth of a consensus opinion 
of the ‘Japanese problem.’  The initial part looks first at the variation between the idea of ‘yellow 
peril’ and the ‘Japanese problem,’ while also confirming the specific elements that defined this 
so called ‘problem.’  These sources and individuals must be reviewed to determine the pattern of 
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prejudice against Japanese Americans.   It must also be noted that the arguments promoting mili-
tary action toward the ‘Japanese problem’ were facilitated from various points of views and for 
various reasons, but the emphasis on ‘invasion’ followed by fifth column activity were so well 
defined for decades that it allowed for this false depiction to construe reality.  Japanese American 
internment became a condition of the United States’ tainted view of the ‘Japanese problem.’ 
 The second portion, Part II, assesses the merit of military necessity presented by intern-
ment supporters and how that topic compares to other threats or geographical areas of concern.  
Did DeWitt have “no alternative but to conclude that the Japanese constituted a potentially dan-
gerous element from the viewpoint of military security”?42  By looking at the government deci-
sion to intern as well as direct examples in their argument, we are able to reaffirm the existence 
of the anti-Japanese movement but also the lack of tangible evidence to support claims of ‘inva-
sion’ or fifth column activity.  Specifically, this portion looks at the use of Magic code breaking 
and the Niihau incident as oft used evidence to verify Japanese American ill desires.  It also re-
views the threat posed by Axis alliance partner Nazi Germany and the nuanced variations on 
how the Hawaiian territory dealt with their large Japanese American population in comparison to 
the American West Coast.  These elements together confirm West Coast Japanese American ex-
traction overstepped military demands. 
 The period between the start of Japanese migration to the United States and Japanese 
American internment is littered with numerous events that help to explain how such an extreme 
outcome occurred.  Efforts to identify Japanese migrants and Japanese Americans as a military 
threat were widespread, descriptive, and represented a wide element of American society and 
should therefore not be overlooked.  The tone of these efforts explained the Japanese race as not 
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only undesirable, as were many other non-white races, but conceptualized a racial plot to domi-
nate the American Pacific states and territories.  Japanese Americans were clearly delineated 
from others based on this notion that they held an inherent desire to conquer all of the Pacific.  
Literature from numerous sources presented a view into the duplicitous schemes of this enemy 
race and guided them toward undemocratic solutions explained as necessary to combat the evil.  
Ideas of necessity were built through intolerance and prejudice based in fear; they were success-
ful because the images depicted the loss of dominance. 
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PART I: ‘YELLOW PERIL’ VERSUS ANTI-JAPANESE RHETORIC 
 
‘Yellow peril’ is often used as a blanket term to define the significant racism found globally to-
ward people of Asian descent during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.  This terminology 
defines a broad view of events and rhetoric and thus encapsulates a high level understanding of 
the Asian experience during the period. Ultimately it highlights the oppression of Asian races as 
a whole in terms of pure racial identification.  This section attempts to draw out the specific ba-
sis of anti-Japanese rhetoric as a separate issue from ‘yellow peril.’  By doing so, a greater un-
derstanding of the racial and national divergence within the Asian races are identified.  For Jap-
anese Americans the racism they faced incorporated aspects of the racial identities of ‘yellow 
peril’ but further connected Imperial Japan’s growing Imperialism based on Eurocentric models 
to a sense of nationalism rarely exhibited or identified in general Asian fears. 
 
 
 The differences between the anti-Japanese movement in the United States and the con-
cept of ‘yellow peril’ are important in understanding how Japanese mass internment occurred.  
Japanese were but only one race that was besieged with the racial concerns of ‘yellow peril.’  Yet 
the discussion on the disconnect between these two terms warrant further discussion.  ’Yellow 
peril’ is a complex topic that incorporates ideas of race and culture in manifesting Asian popula-
tions as a threat to the Western world.  Gary Okihiro argues that ‘yellow peril’ was not solely 
just media sensationalism but “was accorded legitimacy by respected leaders.”43  The idea of 
how this threat would materialize was not always clearly defined and allowed for numerous con-
cepts of irrational fear.  Economic fears that Asian immigrants had a lower standard of living 
than native workers and therefore could undercut the cost of native labor was but only one such 
example.  Racial differences between the Oriental and the Occidental worlds helped broaden this 
misunderstanding and the ominous view of Asians.  Scientific racism authors like Lothrop 
Stoddard in The Rising Tide of Color Against White World-Supremacy (1920) and Madison 
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Grant in The Passing of the Great Race: Or, The Racial Basis of European History (1918) sup-
ported that Asian populations, based on their race, would marginalize the white dominated world 
through vast population growth, increased miscegenation and continued immigration into nations 
considered traditionally white, and both men alluded to collapse of Western superiority.44 
 Writers like Stoddard and Grant argued that race was the bond that kept Asia and its im-
migrants connected internationally.  Despite immigration that took individuals thousands of 
miles from their place of birth, they remained entirely connected to their racial homeland.  Fur-
ther, they argued that those bonds could not be broken because cultural differences could not 
overcome racial ones.45  For Asian races, they were unable to assimilate to Western culture.  As 
such, it was argued by ‘yellow peril’ advocates, that Asians were likely to bring their culture 
with them internationally which clashed and even threatened, in the case of Japanese, that of the 
native population.  In this sense, Japanese were considered similarly unable to assimilate.  Japa-
nese immigrants did not possess the racial ability to assume the cultural traits of their new home-
lands.46  This created a threat to Western nations like the United States.  As Stoddard believed, 
the threat of the ‘colored’ races including Asians, was “A mighty problem - a planet-wide prob-
lem - (which) confronts us today and will increasingly confront us in the days to come.”47  
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 Race, argued the anti-Japanese faction, was significant in encumbering assimilation of 
Japanese immigrants, but it also presented a concern for native populations.  The perceived Japa-
nese inability to assimilate drove racist feelings towards Japanese immigrants and Japanese 
American citizens alike, but it also drove military fears.  This frame of mind was vital for the 
concept of military necessity as it confirmed there was no distinction between Japanese people 
and assumed all had to be disloyal.  The argument of General DeWitt’s Final Report stressed a 
connection between assimilation and loyalty.  DeWitt claimed the Japanese race was unassimila-
ble and argued that their deep cultural ties to religion, Japanese language and education were the 
factors that maintained this connection to Imperial Japan; “Because of the ties of race, the intense 
feeling of filial piety and the strong bonds of common tradition, culture and customs, this popu-
lation (Japanese) presented a tightly-knit racial group.”48   The result was a Japanese American 
population that racially appeared indistinguishable from one another and whose allegiance could 
not be trusted by American officials.  As noted by Historian Eric Muller, family ties were more 
significant than national ties, “loyalty followed families.”49 The General stated in his 1943 report 
that “no ready means existed for determining the loyal and the disloyal with any degree of 
safety.”50 All Japanese, argued DeWitt, whether citizens of the United States or natives to Japan, 
were the same enemies of the United States.  The military considerations were clear, the treat-
ment of Japanese Americans should be no different than native Japanese with the inclusion of 
military internment. 
 Yet, critics of Japanese immigration to the United States argued long before DeWitt that 
if Japanese immigrants were unable to become good Americans, they should not be welcomed 
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members of society.  This argument found support from a wide swath of Americans including a 
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania attorney, Edwin M. Abbott.  Abbott remarked that “The encroach-
ments of the Yellow race on American soil should never be tolerated.  This menace is one that 
should be fought at every turn…It is surely a Yellow peril of a most pernicious kind and every 
true American will respond to the call to duty to enforce most stringent laws to protect our soil, 
our homes, our heritage, and our Nation from such an evil now and forever.”51  Edwin Abbott is 
careful to term those needed to suppress this issue as ‘true Americans’ as not to be confused with 
Japanese Americans.  One respondent to Vanderbilt Jr.’s survey, Walter M Harvey, was an attor-
ney from Tacoma, Washington.  His argument could have doubled for the teacher in The Pride of 
Palomar and her views on assimilation of Japanese Americans, “They (Japanese Americans) do 
not look with favor upon America nor upon American institutions or the Christian religion and 
no matter how long they may live in this Country or in any of our territorial possessions, they 
still hold fast to their loyalty to Japan and its institutions including its method of education and 
its religion.  They are a sharp, shrewd, capable but absolutely unreliable and untrustworthy 
race.”52  Harvey argued that Japanese were loyal to their nation of origin only but also defined 
them by race as ‘unreliable’ or disloyal.  His argument also parallels Madison Grant’s who be-
lieved that “Oriental races, who throughout history have shown little capacity to create, organize 
or even to comprehend Republican institutions”53  should not be trusted.  Both men were unwill-
ing to accept Japanese into democracy due either to their lack of intelligence or their lack of re-
spect. 
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 Numerous politicians agreed that the Japanese race could not assimilate.  According to 
California State Senator Hiram Johnson, “Once Japanese, always Japanese…they will remain 
Japanese to the end.”54  California in particular attempted to prevent Japanese immigration to the 
United States and highlighted those fears as a reason.  California Senate Joint Resolution Num-
ber Six of 1909 drew out concerns on the ability of the Japanese to assimilate by stating, 
“Whereas, The Progress, happiness and prosperity of the people of a nation depend upon a ho-
mogeneous population; people who are unsuited for American citizenship or for assimilation 
with the Caucasian race, has resulted and will result in lowering the American standard of life 
and the dignity and wage-earning capacity of American labor.”55  The state presented their argu-
ment against Japanese immigration on the basis of the state’s economic wellbeing by concluding 
that racially, Japanese could not become or enhance the “homogeneous population.”  Between 
1905 and 1945, the California legislation saw the introduction of anti-Japanese bills every bien-
nial session56 including 27 measures introduced in 1911 alone.57 
 State politicians were not the only ones who found Japanese assimilation impossible.  Af-
ter the 1907 ‘Gentleman’s Agreement’ under President Theodore Roosevelt, in which Japan 
agreed to stop issuing passports for Japanese laborers into the United States,58 the federal gov-
ernment, seventeen years later, amidst continued concerns of Japanese immigrants in the United 
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States exceeding ‘viable’ limits, passed the 1924 Immigration Act outlawing all Japanese immi-
gration and confirming the ineligibility of Japanese immigrants to become naturalized citizens.59  
Future President Franklin D. Roosevelt used a popular racial argument in a 1925 speech where 
he indicates both the United States and Japan do not want to see the mixing of their cultures.  
Japanese could not assimilate to the American way of life the same as Americans could not em-
brace a Japanese lifestyle:   
 
 
 
Californians have properly objected on the sound basic ground that Japanese immigrants 
are not capable of assimilation into the American population…In this question, then, of 
Japanese exclusion from the United States, it is necessary only to advance the true rea-
son—the undesirability of mixing the blood of the two peoples. This attitude would be 
fully understood in Japan, as they would have the same objection to Americans migrating 
to Japan in large numbers.60   
 
 
 
The argument, that Japan too objected to mixing of races, attempted to justify discriminatory pol-
icies but only continued to promote the clearly understood racially driven rhetoric of the anti-
Japanese movement.  
 The perceived inability of Japanese to assimilate into the American culture became a 
point of emphasis for the anti-Japanese movement.  Accordingly, if Japanese immigrants were 
unable to become American, then they would naturally attempt to create a Japanese sphere 
within the United States.  In fact, noted many anti-Japanese writers, Japanese almost always 
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lived in close proximity to other Japanese immigrants in an effort to maintain their cultural herit-
age.61  This appeared to many to support that racial ties bound the Japanese together and pre-
vented their association with Americans.  This argument was significantly more convent that re-
alistic attempts to be inclusive to foreigners.  It further disregarded similar ethnic European 
neighborhoods throughout the nation that functioned as highly connected and sometimes isolated 
communities.  However similar, the racial highlights of Japanese enhanced a negative viewpoint 
not always shared when examining European immigrants, especially as the twentieth century ad-
vanced.  In turn, Japanese immigrants were racially unable to become Americans and therefore 
were a threat as they possessed ties to Imperial Japan.  If race supported they could not assimilate 
it also supported their acceptance of Imperial Japan’s conquest. 
 Certainly the ties between Imperial Japan and its immigrants internationally were diffi-
cult at times to differentiate.  As Gary Okihiro observed, the strong connection Japanese immi-
grants had to their Japanese culture in the form of religion, language, press and education bred 
significant anti-Japanese fear.62  These perceived anti-American actions were understood by 
many to be both racial or nationalistic in nature.  Realistically, the combination of the two per-
ceived concerns, an unassailable race and strong national patriotism linked to an imperial power, 
defined why Japanese were elevated to a military risk not seen by other Asian races.  California 
State Senator W.R. Sharkey’s 1921 comments illustrate how the two ideas combined beliefs on 
Japanese; “The Civic Code of Japan provides that a child born in this Country is a citizen of Ja-
pan and is subject to military duty in Japan between the ages of 17 and 40 years, unless expatri-
ated, therefore the American-born Japanese hold dual citizenship.  First, with allegiance to Japan 
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under military service, and secondary, rights of citizenship in America.  I feel that further com-
ment upon this phase of the situation is unnecessary other than to say that, ‘once a Japanese, al-
ways a Japanese.’”63  Sharkey both attacks the race and nationalism of Japanese indicating that 
Japanese are always Japanese racially but also held full allegiance to the Japanese military.   
Ironically, in Sharkey’s comment Japanese nationalism is understood to be a negative which 
makes American citizenship secondary, yet his own strong nationalistic tie is understood to be a 
positive.  For Sharkey, Japanese Americans could not be relied on as Americans due to their 
race.  
 The connection to the Imperial ‘conquests’ of Japan helps explain how ‘yellow peril’ and 
race alone do not fully explain the anti-Japanese hostility.  Racism certainly played a role in Jap-
anese internment but the racism encapsulated by ‘yellow peril’ cannot stand as a singular expla-
nation.  Authors from the early to middle twentieth century proclaim the inability of Japanese 
immigrants to blend into the fabric of American life significantly related to both the cultural and 
racial differences between the natives and the immigrants.  These differences alone did not make 
them a military threat, but it indicated to many the inability to verify their loyalty to the United 
States in the event of conflict.  As such, it would be incorrect to assume that was the only reason 
for mass internment of Japanese.   Japanese immigrants and Japanese Americans identified as 
national security risks in 1942 found their racial ties to Imperial Japan further associated them 
with Japanese imperialism, military conquest and ideas of nationalism.  
 Race was the understood connection between the Asian populations and their potential 
threat, even if their intentions were not always clear, according to those advancing ‘yellow peril.’  
To the anti-Japanese movement in the early twentieth century, the threat of the Japanese race was 
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not vague.  Although Japanese bore similarities to other Asians from a racial standpoint, that 
similarity alone did not fully explain their threat.  Asian races together formed a concept of often 
undefined concerns to the ‘white’ world but the threat specific to Japanese was enhanced due to 
the rapid advancement of Imperial Japan.  By the early twentieth century, Japan had become a 
significant military power within Asia, who used this strength mimicked from the Western world 
to become an imperial power.64  This constituted a direct threat to the Western powers but also 
the United States who, through the Monroe Doctrine, considered the Pacific their domain.65  
During the Second World War, Japan challenged not only the military standing of the Western 
world but also their racial and cultural superiority over Asia.66  Therefore the Japanese, from a 
nationalistic standpoint, stood out from ‘yellow peril’ as a more defined and realistic threat.  
Their individual race, as Japanese, showed an association to a competitor in the Pacific but also a 
potential militarily hostile nation.  
 The history of Japan’s rise to predominance started when the United States’ forcefully 
‘opened’ Japan to trade in 1853, after which Japan began a rapid modernization based on West-
ern ideals.67  This development included economic, cultural and militaristic changes as Japan 
started to compete with European influence in Asia.  Through its own expansion, Japan believed 
they would be seen by Europe as equals but also avoid European domination of their island na-
tion as well.  In only a few decades, Japan became a powerful force of its own and contested the 
superiority of other Western nations, who only years before it had emulated.  China, a proud and 
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resource-rich nation, failed to modernize with the changing world and became an example to Ja-
pan as the European powers, as well as Japan, began to colonize it for their own benefit.68  An 
indication of Japanese growth was its imperialistic measures in claiming Korea and attacking 
Russia.69  After the Russo-Japanese War, Japan was more than capable of placing an advanced 
army in the field but also commanded respect with a large, modern navy, capable of spreading 
the nation’s prestige outside its own territorial waters.  The influence of the United States in Asia 
and the Pacific, shown in part by its ‘opening’ of Japan to the international community, had in 
many ways, created a rival in Japan.  Unsurprisingly, ideas of potential military conflict between 
the two predominant powers in the Pacific, Japan and the United States, became a frequent topic 
of review. 
 Concern for Imperial Japan as a military opponent began to build well before the Second 
World War despite very little political hostility between the United States and Imperial Japan.  In 
fact, several authors identified Imperial Japan as a greater threat to the United States during the 
First World War than Imperial Germany.  Imperial Germany too was a burgeoning imperialistic 
power during this period of heightened nationalism but its expansionism appeared more benign 
to numerous anti-Japanese writers.70  The difference between the two came back to race.  The 
imperialism of an Asian nation garnered more concern than that of a European nation to the anti-
Japanese movement.  Indeed, the combination of Japanese racial understanding and their unique 
standing in the world guided the Japanese race toward ‘problem’ status.  Author James Francis 
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Abbott, a scholar with experience at the Imperial Japanese Naval Academy and Washington Uni-
versity in St. Louis, lived for some time in Japan.  His book, Japanese Expansion and American 
Policies (1916) argued that American expansion into the Pacific was acceptable policy through 
the Monroe Doctrine whereas Japanese movement needed to be scrutinized as hazardous against 
Western civilization.71  Despite millions of deaths occurring on European battlefields and the 
close Japanese alliance to the United Kingdom at the time of writing, Abbott still envisioned iso-
lationist America to be most interested in the Japanese threat.72  Although advocating for peace 
based on economic cooperation, Abbott feared Japanese expansion.  Further underscoring the 
vast misunderstanding of Japanese immigrants’ culture, Abbott spoke of his disdain of race prej-
udice, “Race prejudice is an evil, and we should strive by every possible means to eradicate it, 
for our own sake,”73 but failed to understand that his approach to Japanese immigrants and Japa-
nese Americans was indeed prejudicial.  His immense failure to properly analyze his own con-
cerns of Imperial Japan as race driven underscores that the anti-Japanese movement gained trac-
tion through significant dramatization of an incomplete and consistently wrong depiction of Ja-
pan and its descendants.  
 Looking again at Scientific Racism advocate Lothrop Stoddard, this concept of Japanese 
racial differences and its threat was discussed in his book as well.  He argued that Japanese mi-
gration was dangerous to world peace and that the Japanese were “Fired by a fervent patriotism” 
to become a global power.74  He concluded that Japan “must find lands where Japanese can 
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breed by the tens of millions if she is not to be automatically overshadowed in course of 
time…This is the secret of her aggressive foreign policy, her chronic imperialism, her extrava-
gant dreams of conquest and ‘world domination.’”75  The idea of “fervent patriotism” related to 
the racial Japanese makeup.  Another author, Carl Crow, directly interwove these concepts to 
identify, what he considered, the true Japanese identity solely linked through the Emperor.  “The 
Japanese constitution, written and interpreted more with a view to strengthening the power and 
prestige of the Emperor than to safeguarding the rights of the people, declares him to be sacred 
and inviolable, the head of the Empire, holding in himself all rights of sovereignty.  The entire 
structure of the Japanese state and the entire system of Japanese morality are based on this foun-
dation.”76  Therefore, describes Crow, the Japanese are wholly connected through the Emperor to 
devotion to Japan and its race.  DeWitt’s Final Report found the worship of the Emperor con-
cerning as it deviated from expectations of proper Americans and strengthened their connection 
to the Japanese homeland.77 
 To be sure, the patriotism displayed by Japanese immigrants to the Emperor and Imperial 
Japan, real or imagined, was a point of emphasis to those opposed to Japanese immigration.  An 
East Coast editor, J. R. Hastings, agreed that the very introduction of Japanese Americans into 
the United States was “of sinister portent” but also that Japan’s brand of patriotism was incon-
sistent with American ideals: 
 
 
 
The ‘peaceful penetration’ by the Japanese to which you refer in your letter is a matter 
that stirs strong feelings in me - possibly because I am a native of California, and have 
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had the opportunity to observe these people and their reactions to Western customs.  In 
my opinion there can be nothing but evil as a result, if we permit this penetration to go 
on.  Their psychology is not ours.  Their patriotism, fanatic devotion to their own ruler, 
moral concepts, stands of living, all are at variance with our own, and to such an extent 
that their presence in numbers is, in my opinion, of sinister portent.78 
 
 
 
J. R. Hastings broaches both the lack of similarities between the two races of people and the as-
sumed duplicitous plotting of the Japanese.  As he states, if continued ‘penetration’ occurs noth-
ing but ‘evil’ can come.  After a 1920 Japanese American and Japanese migrant protest in Ha-
waii to ascertain better pay and working conditions, an official federal report on the incident 
found their actions to have nothing to do with class conflict and everything to do with racial ties 
to their Japanese heritage.79   The Federal report and Hastings appear to align.  The efforts of 
Japanese Americans as individuals to improve their lives were seen only as well scripted maneu-
vers, as though Imperial Japan was nothing more than a ventriloquist controlling its Japanese 
American dolls from across the Pacific.  The anti-Japanese movement of the United States bru-
tally engaged Japanese Americans, attacking their psychology and customs.  They further ques-
tioned their ambitions and loyalties, marking them a group that threaten those that greatly out-
numbered them.  Hastings, like many of his compatriots including the fictional character Don 
Farrel in The Pride of Palomar, could not see beyond their own ‘patriotism’ in their attempt to 
fend off invaders and protect their nation.  The “fanatic devotion” and “patriotism” which de-
fined Japanese Americans were incompatible with American society.  The continual attempts by 
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Japanese Americans to gain equality made those characteristics dangerous, albeit both “devo-
tion,” and “patriotism” were considered desired American virtues.  Unsurprisingly, the hypocrisy 
of these shared traits were lost on the anti-Japanese movement. 
 The perceived connections between a nationalistic Japanese race and Imperial Japan, as 
well as their assumed inability to assimilate, was portrayed by the anti-Japanese movement as a 
potential national security crisis.  Pundits from varying fields including the media, politicians, 
military advisors and cultural experts argued these links indicated the military aims of the Japa-
nese race as a whole and therefore the military necessity of intervention.  The mass internment, 
as argued by the military, established the same arguments of military necessity toward the Japa-
nese threat as had been presented over the last forty plus years.  Arguments of cultural links, ina-
bility to assimilate and the ever present connection to the Japanese race highlighted in the official 
document explaining internment, Final Report, but the same arguments had been seen for years 
in anti-Japanese literature.  Military necessity remains the link between anti-Japanese literature 
and Executive Order 9066. 
 
Fears of an Imagined Japanese ‘Invasion' 
Some of the earliest anti-Japanese writers argued that the threat of Japanese immigrants and 
Japanese Americans bordered on an ‘invasion.’  In fact, by the early twentieth century some 
writers indicated the invasion was already happening.  These arguments perpetuated a growing 
fear of Japanese Americans by connecting them to hostile forces of Imperialistic Japan and the 
racial hysteria on the ‘yellow’ races of Asia.   By connecting Japanese Americans to ideas of ‘in-
vasion’ those opposed to Japanese immigration were indeed bridging the gap between a hypo-
thetical minority population risk to a national security emergency.  Through continuation of this 
message into the 1920s the anti-Japanese consensus formed a unified position of military need 
toward Japanese Americans. 
 
 
 Some of the first individuals to argue this point of military necessity, between 1898 and 
the mid 1920s, specifically warned of a Japanese ‘invasion.’  The powerful term ‘invasion’ was 
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often found in anti-Japanese literature of the time and represented a wide array of American soci-
ety.  Two of the more powerful and influential West Coast media voices against Japanese Ameri-
cans were those of William Randolph Hurst and the already mentioned John P. Young.80  Their 
newspapers pushed obviously racist agendas but their continuing emphasis on the military con-
cern was evident.  In 1905, Young’s Chronicle noted that the “inundation of Japanese” if not 
stopped would lead to a “complete Orientalization of the Pacific Coast”81 while Hurst’s Exam-
iner in the same year reported that Japanese in Hawaii were having infantry drills and were 
armed.  Within the same article it was said that the Japanese were “secretly preparing for hostili-
ties.”82  In September of 1905, the Examiner again visualized the Japanese threat to its readers by 
publishing an illustration of a Japanese solider whose shadow loomed over the Pacific and Cali-
fornia.83  The image’s message was clear; the Japanese were a legitimate threat to American 
dominance in the Pacific and even the American West Coast.  Invasion from foreign forces as 
well as those currently armed and drilling in Hawaii and the West Coast were presented as a real-
ity to readers of Hurst papers. 
 The influence of the media, especially Hurst papers, was felt throughout the years that 
followed these 1905 publishings.  In 1921, editor for the New York American, W.A. Thayer, 
noted the work of a Hurst correspondent in uncovering Japanese treachery:  
 
 
 
Mr. Joseph Timmons, of the Los Angeles Examiner staff… has just made a thorough in-
vestigation of the Japanese ‘invasion’ of the Hawaiian Islands.  A series of articles giv-
ing the results of his investigation is now appearing in the Hurst papers.  Mr. Timmons 
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finds that the islands, so essential to the defense of the Pacific Coast, are more like Japa-
nese territory than American, and that in the event of war all the islands except Oahu 
could be taken easily by Japan, while Oahu is not prepared to stand a siege.  Few of the 
Japanese could be counted on to be loyal to America, and their influence is all toward a 
continuation of the ‘peaceful peril penetration’ of the mainland.84   
 
 
 
Thayer expressed Japanese intentions as an “invasion” and “peaceful” penetration.  His terminol-
ogy alludes to fears of the Japanese race but it also directs his reader to acknowledging a national 
security element underlying Japanese intentions.  Along those lines, Thayer also questioned the 
loyalty of Japanese in Hawaii.  This question was especially important as the islands appeared 
more like Japan than America to the editor.  Historian Gary Okihiro points out that during the 
1920s Hawaii’s political and economic leadership pushed a strong idealized American culture to 
Americanize non-whites but also to oppose Japanese cultural influence.85  Thus Thayer’s com-
ments must be attempting to illustrate that the Japanese race was the reason for the territory be-
ing more Japanese than American. 
 One of the more influential military writers of the early twentieth century, Alfred Mahan, 
believed in the threat of Japanese.  Although Mahan died in 1914, his work on naval strategy and 
views on the Pacific greatly influenced many during this period.  As a former American Rear 
Admiral, Mahan believed future conflict for the United States would be emanating from the Pa-
cific and that resources should be diverted from the Atlantic to counter this risk:  
 
 
 
Considering the American states as members of the European family, as they are by tra-
ditions, institutions, and languages, it is in the Pacific, where the westward course of em-
pire again meets the East, that their relations to the future of the world become most ap-
parent.  The Atlantic, bordered on either shore by the European family in the strongest 
                                                 
84 Vanderbilt Jr., 20. 
85 Okihiro, xi. 
  43 
and most advanced types of its political development, no longer serves, but binds to-
gether.86   
 
 
 
Mahan noted the races of Western Europe and the United States were so similar that conflict be-
tween the two appeared implausible.  Yet, the commonality of  “tradition, institutions and lan-
guages” did not exist between the East and the West.  These differences that served to link some 
were likely to create conflict between others based on race.  It was the Pacific, where Japan’s ex-
pansionist goals presented a significant risk to the national security of the United States, and to 
western civilization, that Mahan found concerning.   Again, writing right before his death in 
1914, Mahan urged then Secretary of the Navy, Franklin D. Roosevelt, to focus on the Pacific 
over the Atlantic.87  Although on the eve of the First World War Mahan inexplicably failed to 
realize the true nature Europe’s coming conflict.  He, like James Abbott, was more concerned 
with the racial complexion of the Pacific to the colonial concerns of the Atlantic.  Together, the 
writers underscored how the combination of race and nationalism, something they viewed as a 
positive in Eurocentric nations, was a threat when displayed by the nations of the East. 
 The overall focus of Mahan’s earlier work, The Interest of America In Sea Power, Pre-
sent and Future (1898), directed itself against Japan and China as the former continued to gain 
influence in the Pacific.  Interestingly, China was still a concern for Mahan despite Japan’s dom-
inance in the region and China’s inability to avoid European partition.  Mahan’s inclusion of 
China as a threat points again to his history of to indiscriminately lumping ‘yellow’ races when 
politically and militarily only Japan had a legitimate opportunity to expand its empire.  The use 
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of a racialized notion of Asians illustrates that Mahan, at least initially, saw Asians as a singular 
unit.  The book continued by indicating that dividing the fleet between the two oceans, even if 
connected via canal in Central America, would severely hinder American naval power in turning 
back the imminent Japanese threat.  Immediate action was needed to prepare the nation to protect 
the West Coast, including consideration of those peoples coming to populate the region: 
 
 
 
The military needs of the Pacific States, as well as their supreme importance to the whole 
country, are yet a matter of the future, but of a future so near that provision should begin 
immediately.  To weigh their importance, consider what influence in the Pacific would be 
attributed to a nation comprising only the States of Washington, Oregon, and California, 
when filled with such men as now people them and still are pouring in, and which con-
trolled such maritime centers as San Francisco, Puget Sound, and the Columbia River.  
Can it be counted less because they are bound by the ties of blood and close political un-
ion to the great communities of the East?  But such influence, to work without jar and 
friction requires underlying military readiness, like the proverbial iron hand under the 
velvet glove.88 
 
 
 
This powerful statement alerted the reader to the risk of Japanese immigrants in the United 
States.  The hypothetical question presented by Mahan explained that without action in the near 
future, the controlling element on the West Coast would be Japanese immigrants.  Not only were 
Japanese immigrants occupiers, they were ‘pouring’ into the nation with the potential to ‘control’ 
multiple maritime centers.  Census figures place the Japanese immigrant population within the 
United States at just over 24,000 in 1900, a number that questions both the idea of Japanese 
‘pouring’ in and occupying.89  Further, their residence in important maritime cities invoked mili-
tary concern.  The concentration of Japanese immigrants and Japanese Americans in maritime 
locations was proof of harmful intent to Mahan in the early 1900s, but also to DeWitt in 1942.  
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The latter stated in support of internment that “It could not be established, of course, that the lo-
cation of thousands of Japanese adjacent to strategic points verified the existence of some vast 
conspiracy to which all of them were parties…It seemed equally beyond doubt…that the pres-
ence of other was not mere coincidence.”90  DeWitt also tailored his message of military neces-
sity to include the Japanese inability to assimilate, an idea Mahan alluded to in his book decades 
before.  Ties of "blood,” or race, were the defining factor.  Mahan’s statement concluded by indi-
cating military action is the answer.  The idea of the “iron hand under the velvet glove” further 
alluded to the application of military invention.  A newspaper editor W.W. Emmerson came to a 
similar conclusion as Mahan, writing in 1921 that the only potential solution would be one “that 
can only be settled by the arbitrament of the sword (Author emphasis).”91   Although Emmerson 
was writing a couple decades after Mahan, the tongue in cheek conclusion on the ‘Japanese prob-
lem’ presented by both men alluded to military solutions.   
 In the years that followed Mahan’s work additional books began to touch on the ‘Japa-
nese problem.’  One of these military writers was Homer Lea.  Despite having never served in 
the military, Lea presented himself as an expert on military affairs and did actually become a 
leading military advisor to China.  His popular book, Valor of Ignorance (1909) showed him in 
full military regalia though he held no rank.  Having spent time in China as a military advisor, 
Lea believed that the isolationism of the United States was a major concern to the aggressive tac-
tics of Japanese expansion.  Certainly, he argued, the two nations were on a collision course over 
the Pacific.92  Not only did he believe that Japanese expansion would come into contact with the 
American territories of the Philippines and Hawaii, but also the American West Coast.  The 
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Valor of Ignorance went to great lengths to illustrate how a literal Japanese invasion and Ameri-
can defenses would likely play out in the coming conflict.  A central aspect of this coming con-
flict was the Japanese immigrant ‘invasion’ Lea indicated had already begun.  Working in con-
cert, Japanese immigrants, Japanese Americans and Japan would be well coordinated and repre-
sent a true military concern capable of rapid dislocation of American military forces.  Lea’s text, 
despite his actual lack of military experience, gathered great support from those within the mili-
tary establishment of the United States. 
 The Valor of Ignorance was transparent on the perceived issues with Japanese immi-
grants and Japanese American citizens:   
 
 
 
Japanese immigration into the Hawaiian Islands, from 1900 to 1908, has been 65,708.  
The departures during this periods were 42,313.  The military unfit have in this manner 
been supplanted by the veterans of the great war, and the military occupation of Hawaii 
tentatively accomplished.  In these islands at the present time the number of Japanese 
who have completed their active term of service in the imperial armies, a part of whom 
are veterans of the Russian War, exceeds the entire field army of the United States.  
Within twenty-four hours after a declaration of war the solitary American battalion that 
stands guard over these islands will disappear.  As Hawaiian sovereignty passed forever 
in a single day, so shall this Republic be put aside in the same manner and in longer pe-
riod of time.93 
 
 
 
Lea’s view on Japanese Americans was entirely based on their suspected militant nature.  They 
were, in his judgement, instrumental in a plot to establish Japanese control over the Pacific.  As 
stated also by Mahan, they were an occupying force and a direct military threat to the United 
States.  The immigrants themselves, connected to their homeland though military service and 
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race, had less interest in agricultural pursuits than military ones; simply put, they were soldiers 
from the ‘great’ Russo-Japanese War only waiting for the order to advance. 
 Lea’s text was strongly supported by the military community.  Lieutenant General Adna 
R Chaffee, former United States Army Chief of Staff, wrote an introduction to the book which 
started by pronouncing “Hail - The Valor of Ignorance!!”94 before concluding that “We do not 
know of any work in military literature published in the United States more deserving the atten-
tion of men who study the history of the United States and the Science of War than this - The 
Valor of Ignorance.”95  Major General JP Story also wrote an introduction to the book which 
supported the overall message of Lea’s text.96  Both generals certainly had self-serving goals 
which rabble rousing promoted.  It is not happenstance that Lea concluded the book with numer-
ous pages citing the strength of Pacific navies in shipping, guns and personnel; statistics Lea in-
formed illustrated the severe disadvantage of the United States to Japan.97  Lea, much like these 
two generals that supported him, had a vested interest in seeing the American military expand 
and their argument assures the necessity of said expansion.  Yet Chaffee and Story also com-
manded significant prestige and authority over military matters.  For active military leaders with 
the ability to push actual policy to support the idea of a Japanese ‘invasion’ as very conceivable 
and Japanese immigrants as Japanese military operatives here for the coming ‘invasion’ supports 
the very real nature of the anti-Japanese movement’s push to term them a national security threat. 
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 Mahan and Lea were explicit in their ideas of literal Japanese ‘invasion’ with the use of 
immigration.  The racial and nationalistic connections presented Japanese immigrants no differ-
ent than Japanese in military uniform.  Other writers found the Japanese threat significant but 
presented Japanese immigration in less dramatic terms.  However, their racial and nationalistic 
understanding of Japanese did not waver.  James Abbott in Japanese Expansion in American 
Policies defined Japanese immigration to be an intentional “peaceful conquest of the country 
(United States).”98  He argued that Japanese immigrants were devoted to “their national history 
and its ideals”99 and therefore had no interest in becoming true American citizens.  In fact, stated 
Abbott, Japanese immigrants were migrating so fast and in such great numbers that they intended 
to create their own Japanese-based nation and could do so through the democratic process “when 
his vote is one of a majority.”100  Although between 1900 and 1924 Japanese immigration con-
sisted of only 245,000 people, or less than .002 percent of the population of the United States in 
1920, and with the majority being in Hawaii, Abbott states that Japanese immigrants could be-
come the majority as well as threaten the United States through democracy.101  Carl Crow further 
emphasized Japanese culture a threat within the United States.  In his book, Japan and America: 
A Contrast (1916), he pressed the unassimilability of the Japanese race as well as connected it 
with the idea of the Japanese empire.  In the first chapter of the book, titled “Problems of the Pa-
cific,” the author quickly identifies Japanese immigration to the United States as a concern; “So 
different are the institutions of the two peoples that neither can without danger to itself adopt the 
ideals and culture of the other…the influx of a large number of Japanese to the United States 
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would create new labor problems and seriously threaten American institutions.”102  Democracy 
according to Crow, was at risk because of Japanese immigration.  Crow, much like Abbott, intro-
duced his comments from the position of a Japanese ‘cultural expert’ based on his time living in 
Asia and interacting with China and Japan.  Yet, racial identification, not culture, shows why 
Crow explained Imperial Japan to be a “menace” and “a serious issue”103 but also how he incor-
porated that to include all Japanese.104 
 Assumed ties between Japanese Americans and national security concerns in the United 
States was not limited to any one group.  The anti-Japanese movement in fact connected numer-
ous factions and segments of society but few were as powerful and outspoken as politicians.  As 
seen previously, few elected officials scrutinized the Japanese people as did Californians, espe-
cially James Phelan.  California Senator James Phelan was a highly vocal anti-Japanese advocate 
that spent the better part of three decades defaming his Japanese American constituents.  Phelan 
wholeheartedly agreed that people of Japanese ancestry could not assimilate or become viable 
members of the American fabric.  Even more so, the Senator described Japanese immigration as 
a legitimate threat to destabilize and even colonize the American territories of the Pacific.  In a 
1921 statement that was later added to the Federal Congressional Record, Phelan commented 
that the Japanese population in Hawaii constituted an issue of national security.  “It is incon-
sistent with our national interests to harbor in the islands people, now comprising one-half their 
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entire population, who owe loyalty and military service to Japan and cannot be American-
ized.”105  The comment harkens back to how Japanese were unable to assimilate racially and 
how that established disloyalty.  Potentially more importantly, it connects this issue with that of 
military concern.  In a 1912 letter to then Presidential candidate Woodrow Wilson, Phelan again 
identifies Japanese immigrants and Japanese Americans as “a blight on our civilization” which 
are “destructive of the home life of the people.”106  He continues by associating this in terms of 
invasion stating that “The Japanese have invaded the Central valleys of California” and conclud-
ing that if Japanese immigration continues, “California would be a plantation and the white pop-
ulation would for a period of time, possibly, remain as overseers, but, indeed, with my 
knowledge of the Japanese, that would be for a very short time.  The end would soon super-
vene.”107   Like so many others, Phelan’s message establishes a future void of ‘white’ American 
homogeny and political control. 
 Arguments like Phelan’s which stressed the growing likelihood of Japanese superiority 
on the American West Coast became more common with time and marked a consensus within 
the anti-Japanese movement.  Japanese Americans were viewed as an existential threat despite 
minority status and citizenship.  Congressman George Favrot of Louisiana wrote to Cornelius 
Vanderbilt Jr. in 1921 stating: 
 
 
 
I agree with you that the only solution of the problem is the absolute exclusion of all Ori-
entals.  Japan’s growing power is a menace to us, and I fear that the average American 
fails to realize the gravity of the situation.  Japan is over-populated.  Her present area is 
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insufficient for the support of her population.  And her industry and her commerce are not 
sufficient to supply the deficiencies of her resources.  She is driven by a force inexorable, 
resistless and relentless; a force before which statesmanship is helpless…The Sentiment 
of the white colonials of Great Britain’s Pacific possessions will not permit of their use as 
a Japanese dumping ground.  Such is the naval power of Great Britain that Japan dare not 
attempt to force upon the British colonies the reception of her undesirable national.  Fol-
lowing the line of least resistance, she must look to our Pacific coast.108 
 
 
 
It should be noted that Australia too struggled with anti-Japanese sentiment and eventually 
banned all Japanese immigration to maintain a ‘white’ nation.109  The congressman’s comments 
clearly speaks to efforts of nations like Australia to maintain a homogeneous nation for ‘whites.’  
Numerous individuals attempted to draw parallels with how better off Australia had been as a re-
sult of its firm stance on the ‘yellow peril.’  In Japanese Expansion and American Policies, Ab-
bott gives pause for what he argues could have been; “For the condition of Australia to-day with 
respect to the physical subjugation of the country resembles that of America a century ago.”110  
 Favrot’s statement has a deep underlying military tone to it as well.  Indeed, the congress-
man considers ‘statesmanship as helpless’ in solving the menace.  The solution he argues can be 
understood by observation of how Great Britain controlled its Pacific possessions.  It is not poli-
tics that had thwarted the Japanese migration to British controlled regions but the many guns of 
the Royal Navy.  Favrot believed that the British had allowed their powerful navy to dictate their 
resolute stand on Japanese immigration.  However, this does not appear an option for the United 
States, implies Favrot, as he ended his statement with the concern of the American West Coast, 
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without preventative military authority on the matter, was now the target of Japanese ‘dumping.’  
Military strength dictated immigration and the United States in the eyes of Favrot had not done 
enough to forestall aggressive Japanese colonization. 
 Ideas of Japanese ‘invasion’ had significant literature, and support, within the anti-Japa-
nese community.  Authors like those writing in The Valor of Ignorance's introductions predicted 
active Imperial Japanese invasion while those such as Abbott and Crow suggested the ‘invasion’ 
was likely to develop internally from immigrants.  Concepts of race, culture and loyalty con-
nected the Japanese immigrants and Japanese Americans to Imperial Japanese soldiers as well.  
The racial differences presented between them were indistinguishable.  This link further allowed 
for a military agenda to take hold of the ‘Japanese problem.’  As all Japanese were of the same 
identical race, then the methods of containment, as military action, should too be based on racial 
containment. 
 Military intelligence also played an active role in how Japanese immigration was under-
stood.  The intelligence community of the United States included the army’s intelligence group 
G-2, the navy’s Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), the State Department, and the Bureau of In-
vestigation before being renamed the Federal Bureau of Investigation in 1935.111  All of these 
departments concluded in reports between 1920 and early 1930s that the placement of Japanese 
Americans was consistent with Japan’s designs on the Pacific.  The reports support that the rela-
tionship between Japanese immigrants and Japanese Americans with Imperial Japan were in 
agreement with anti-Japanese writers.  That is to say, the military intelligence community con-
firmed the Imperial Japanese threat in the Pacific was real and consistent on racial lines. 
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 A report by G-2 Colonel George Brooke, “Estimate of the Japanese Situation as it Affects 
the Territory of Hawaii, From the Military Point of View” (1920), illustrates several important 
views on Japanese immigrants.  The official military document indicated that actions in Hawaii 
were a part of a “peaceful expansion and penetration” and that this was a part of a larger 
“scheme” of “absorption and consolidation.”112  Brooke indicated that the Japanese race and cul-
ture were inseparable, leading to a “very complete system of espionage” in the Hawaii islands.113  
This connection of race and culture was understood to include the entire community.  As Okihiro 
argued and Brooke confirmed though the report, military intelligence believed Japanese busi-
nesses, media, religion and education advanced nationalistic Japanese views and in turn “pro-
moted colonization in various parts of the world.”114  Accordingly, the Japanese within the is-
lands were working in concert for the Emperor.  The report also reveals strong misunderstanding 
of Japanese culture.  Brooke indicated that Japanese procreation was used as a weapon and that it 
“may make even polygamy a virtue.”115  Immigration was considered an issue, but the continued 
‘procreation’ of Japanese people was noteworthy to Brooke who went as far as to claim that po-
lygamy might be involved.  This assessment, that Japanese Americans and Japanese immigrants 
were participating in polygamy, had no basis whatsoever and distinctly confirmed a complete 
misapprehension of the Japanese people.  Brooke fully asserted his knowledge on the Japanese 
plan of ‘absorption and consolidation’ and then failed to comprehend basic Japanese culture.  
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The anti-Japanese movement took significant liberties in arguing the loyalty and attitudes of Jap-
anese Americans yet comments such as Brooke’s were solidly out of focus with reality and veri-
fied the omnipresent nature of anti-Japanese racism.  
 Brooke’s successor at G-2, Captain S. A. Wood Jr, also saw concern in Japanese procrea-
tion.  Multiple anti-Japanese authors, including James Abbott, Brooke and Wood, noted that Jap-
anese immigration, if allowed to continue at a high rate, had the potential to overwhelm Ameri-
can society democratically.116  Although many Japanese immigrants had virtually no opportunity 
to become naturalized citizens, their children born in Hawaii were Americans by law.  Almost 70 
percent of the Japanese American population in Hawaii in 1933 were able to vote, a number that 
only increased with time.117  In “The Japanese Situation in Hawaii” (1921), Wood stated “It must 
be remembered that they feel that they are as much subject to Japan’s laws and regulations as if 
they were actually living in Japan…Will these voters who are American citizens of Japanese an-
cestry vote according to the principles of American citizens in the United States or will they vote 
according to the vest interest of the Japanese community, and this means as directed by the Japa-
nese government?”118  His comments link race and culture as one element when referring to Jap-
anese.  American democracy was being destroyed “by the infiltration of an alien and unassimila-
ble race.”119  The text also subtly notes the difference in Japanese Americans and ‘American citi-
zens.’  Japanese Americans it was expected, would not vote for the common goals of ‘white’ 
American citizens causing continued alarm to Japanese American democratic strength.  
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  Not only was democracy indicated to be at risk but it was the natural rights provided 
through democracy to Japanese Americans that threatened the nation.  Infringement of those cor-
ner stones of democracy, some argued, was the only means to protect the insinuations of govern-
ment.  The institutions of Western society, the peaceful glue between Europe and the United 
States in the mind of Mahan, were institutions military intelligence deemed inaccessible to the 
Japanese race.  They were far from alone, as Mahan, James Abbott, Madison Grant, George 
Brooke and S. A. Wood all dedicate time in illustrating the incompatibility of Japanese and dem-
ocratic ideals.120  Japanese Americans, defined by race as inherently Japanese and not American, 
threatened the American way of life through arguably the most basic demand of democracy, the 
right to vote.  This paradox then supported a military solution to the ‘Japanese question’ as it ex-
tended capabilities not accessible to civil authorities.  By allowing a military option, Hawaiian 
authorities could circumvent the individual rights Japanese Americans expected and deserved.  
Continual military viewpoints depicting Japanese American ‘invasion’ lessened public concern 
for these citizens and cast them as dangerous scapegoats for non existent national security issues.  
Unsurprisingly, when national security appeared at risk, military options leap to the forefront and 
a scared American populace found little concern for Japanese Americans defined as treacherous 
for decades. 
 Military intelligence agencies, both in Hawaii and on the American mainland, were form-
ing a consensus on the Japanese race.  As stated by a Bureau of Investigations report, “Japanese 
Problem in the United States,” (1921) “the white race, in no long space of time, would be driven 
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from the state, and California eventually become a province of Japan…further, that it would be 
only a question of time until the entire Pacific coast region would be controlled by the Japa-
nese.”121  The report pressed the situation’s importance by again alluding to the significant future 
change to be expected without drastic intervention.  The conclusion was that race and ties to Im-
perial Japan created a military problem.  
 Another report known as the “Summerall Report” (1922) built on these themes.  The doc-
ument concluded that the second generation Japanese, Nisei, were “a military liability to the 
United States.”122  The ‘Summerall Report’ did much to defame the presence of Japanese Ameri-
cans.  The document considered familiar issues including population trends, inability to assimi-
late and their reliance on language schools and education related to Imperial Japan and connec-
tion with Japan’s consulate.123  The ‘Summerall Report’ cited the Japanese consulate in Hawaii 
to be a source of duplicitous Japanese planning and operations.  Their presence reinforced racial 
ties to the homeland and reaffirmed Japanese American militaristic goals in the United States.  
The Japanese Foreign Office caused concern right up until the attack on Pearl Harbor, with the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Hawaii Field Office Agent in Charge Robert Shrivers calling it 
“definitely a source of potential danger.”124  The conclusion of the ‘Summerall Report’ too was 
familiar; Japan and Japanese Americans represented the greatest single threat to the Pacific.125  
 Military intelligence was but one perspective on Japanese immigration in the United 
States.  It did not, however, greatly differ from other perspectives presented by anti-Japanese 
writers.  Like those that wrote on Japanese culture or on the political ramifications of Japanese 
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immigration, military intelligence drew similarities to Imperial Japan from Japanese in the 
United States.  As a 1929 joint ONI and G-2 document argued, “beyond any question the Japa-
nese race in the Hawaiian Islands, whether alien or native born, is a very definite military liabil-
ity to the United States, and any failure to estimate the race as such will in the final analysis, re-
sult adversely for the army.”126  Without question, the Japanese race was deemed a threat.  At no 
point were individuals listed, it was the entirety of the race no matter the citizenship that was the 
potential threat.  The report confirmed this with its conclusion which stated, “In the event of a 
war with Japan all Japanese, alien and Hawaiian-born, of all ranks, should be considered as en-
emy aliens ab initio.”127  Japanese Americans, according to their own government, were a for-
eign enemy. 
 
From Fears of an ‘Invasion’ to ‘Fifth Column’ Rhetoric 
 
Few things in history are static including anti-Japanese rhetoric.  From the beginning of Japa-
nese immigration to the United States, Americans saw them as racially and culturally different, 
eventually leading to prejudice.  As argued by this paper, this type of prejudice highlighted the 
potential threat of Japanese to the United States.  Between 1868 and the early 1930s the threat 
was thought to be of an ‘invasion.’  This shifted during the 1930s to predicate the method of Jap-
anese espionage to be based on the concept of fifth columns.  Despite this, Japanese Americans 
still were identified as a threat worthy of military review. 
 
 
 Eventually, ideas of ‘invasion’ were replaced with the more modern understanding of 
fifth columns.  Fifth columns focused on support for an invading party through numerous means, 
including sabotage, due to the loyalty shown to the attacking force.  They were a Trojan Horse 
made up of foreign spies and domestic traitors.128  This was not a new concept and although 
some indicated that Japanese Americans were literally ‘invaders’ many others understood the 
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‘invasion’ terminology to be categorical support for Japanese military attacks.  The anti-Japanese 
movement at various times argued Japanese nationals living in the United States were enemy 
agents and enemy soldiers, but also seemingly normal Japanese Americans whose loyalty was to 
Imperial Japan and not the United States.  During the late 1930s and early 1940s as Nazi Ger-
many swept across nations in Western Europe including France in May of 1940, many argued 
that their impressive victories were in large part due to fifth columnists.129   This fear soon built 
an American assumption of sinister intent which included the Japanese.  After the attack on Pearl 
Harbor Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox called Japanese fifth column activity the “most effec-
tive” outside of Norway.130  The idea that Japanese immigrants themselves were going to be in-
vaders was substituted with expectations of espionage and sabotage.  The anti-Japanese move-
ment began to quickly disseminate this new variation of their rhetoric.  They argued that Japa-
nese Americans could cause major disruption and distractions, and obtain significant intelligence 
for enemies of the United States.  Despite this perceived change in Japanese methodology, there 
was no change in the racial and cultural ideas that presented them as a military concern.   
 Leading historian on Japanese American internment Brian Hayashi argues that by the mid 
1930s American military intelligence no longer feared Japanese invasion of the United States 
and that anti-Japanese prejudice was not widespread.131  His article, “Kilsoo Hann, American In-
telligence, and the Anticipated Japanese Invasion of California, 1931-1943” notes that the Amer-
ican military’s assessment of Japanese Americans shifted during this period.  According to him, 
there remained a faction within the United States military that believed the propaganda of Kilsoo 
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Hann, a Korean working with the American military against Japan.  This group was swayed by 
Kilsoo Hann’s beliefs that Japanese Americans were still a disloyal threat to the United States.132  
Yet, Hayashi presents a case that American military intelligence was not among those that feared 
a supposed Japanese American fifth column and they had concluded Japanese Americans were 
loyal.  Hayashi’s argument enhances the delineation between shifting anti-Japanese rhetoric as 
few, if any, writers were expecting a literal Japanese American invasion in the mid 1930s.  How-
ever, documents from several perspectives during the middle to late 1930s and early 1940s con-
tinue to suggest, contrary to Hayashi, that numerous policy experts including those in military 
intelligence had only reimagined the Japanese threat as the fifth column, not dismissed it.  More 
so, the racial ties that connected Japanese did not diminish during this period as evidenced by nu-
merous documents. 
 Looking specifically at military intelligence, a 1933 G-2 document illustrates both the 
shift to fifth column but also that issues of loyalty associated with race still existed.  The docu-
ment read in part, “The local Japanese population will be disloyal to the United States” and, 
“there will be, in any war, an appreciable group loyal to the enemy.”  That group will know 
“where all power plants are located; where all wires and cables (including the fire control cables) 
are placed; what the sources of water supply are; where dams, reservoirs, and pumping plants are 
built; and where all military, navel and civilian owned gasolines and oils are stored.”133  The ex-
pectation of the report was that “considerable damage by the employment of sabotage” was 
likely.134  A further joint Army-Navy Committee report commissioned by the President in 1936 
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found reason to fear Hawaii’s Japanese population to be future partisans for Japan.135   The re-
port accepted that the frequent docking of Japanese vessels on the islands reinforced Japanese 
American loyalty to Japan; “every effort of Japanese naval personnel ashore here appears to be 
deliberately calculated to advance Japanese nationalism and to cement bonds of loyalty.”136  It 
was shortly after this report that Roosevelt proclaimed that ‘concentration camps’ were a viable 
solution to Japanese Americans in the event of war.137  Again, nationalism as connected through 
race reflected on loyalty. 
 President Roosevelt himself was an important factor in Japanese American internment.  
His failure to prevent Japanese American internment is often cited as a major cause of intern-
ment.  As noted before, historian Greg Robinson supports that the President engaged in Japanese 
American policies with little concern or disdain for Japanese themselves, but rather as a political 
outlet to boost his own goals.  The popularity of the anti-Japanese movement, argues Robinson, 
influenced the President’s interest in eventual mass internment with relatively little concern for 
civil liberties.138  A prime example of this was the President’s disinterest in ending mass exclu-
sion in favor of individual internment as advocated by the Department of War and Western De-
fense Command for most of 1944.  The reason was simple, the 1944 election and Roosevelt’s in-
terest in his political affairs over individual rights.139  His interest in the ‘Japanese problem’ 
started years before the Second World War.  In correspondence between Mahan and himself in 
1914, Roosevelt agreed with Mahan’s understanding on the racial hostility of the Japanese race 
                                                 
135 Robinson, By Order of the President: FDR and the Internment of Japanese Americans, 51-54 
136 Ibid, 56. 
137 Okihiro, 174. 
138 Robinson, By Order of the President: FDR and the Internment of Japanese Americans, 167-
170. 
139 Muller, 94-97. 
  61 
and its inherent risk to the United States.140  It is clear that the influence of the anti-Japanese 
movement and its emphasis on race, nationalism, and military threat had profound effects on the 
future President.  In a May 1940 ‘Fire Side Chat’ so common to Roosevelt’s tenure in office, he 
kept the fifth column threat at the forefront of the conversation.  The speech clearly meant to 
draw significant attention to Nazi Germany and its military conquest of France and the Low 
Countries in May of 1940 which many believed again to be the work of the German fifth col-
umn.  Fear of the fifth column was almost palpable in the spring of 1940 as indicated by reports 
of espionage.  On a single day in May of 1940 the Federal Bureau of Investigations received over 
2,800 complaints while the entire period between 1933 and 1938 averaged only 35 a year.141  
Fear of fifth column activity elevated concern of the ‘outsider.’  The discussion read in part: “To-
day’s threat to our national security is not a matter of military weapons alone.  We know of other 
methods, new methods of attack.  The Trojan Horse.  The Fifth Column that betrays a nation un-
prepared for treachery.  Spies, saboteurs and traitors are the actors in this new strategy.  With all 
of these we must and will deal vigorously.”142  Although heightened by events in Europe, Roose-
velt’s understanding of the racial conflict in the Pacific certainly played a role as well.  Japanese 
Americans too were considered foreigners in the United States by many and often faced segrega-
tion.143  Imperial Japan also were allied with Nazi Germany and its assumed fifth column threat.  
By 1940, the Japanese immigrant ‘issues’ and American military concern in the Pacific had 
linked the needed preconditions for internment. 
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 The idea of fifth column threats were widespread.  Interestingly, the cartoonist and equal-
ity advocate Theodor Seuss Geisel, better known as children’s book writer Dr. Seuss, used his 
skills to present political cartoons attacking fascists Adolf Hitler, Benito Mussolini and Father 
Charles Coughlin, isolationists like Charles Lindbergh and segregationist Eugene Talmadge of 
Georgia.  He also besieged Japanese Americans.  His February 1942 comic published in PM 
shows a line of West Coast Japanese Americans, their faces indistinguishable from one another, 
in a line to collect bricks of TNT labelled ‘Honorable 5th Column.’  The text of the comic reads, 
“Waiting for the Signal From Home…” and has a Japanese male with a telescope looking West 
to Japan.  Seuss, a social advocate for numerous American minorities, appears entirely accepting 
of the notion of the Japanese fifth column’s coming attack.144  His generally left-leaning judge-
ment appears swayed by the overwhelming plethora of anti-Japanese propaganda. 
 Despite the change in rhetoric from ‘invasion’ to fifth column activity, from 1898 to 1941 
the emphasis placed on the Japanese military threat from Japanese immigrants and Japanese 
Americans living in the United States did not change.  To be sure, it could be argued that it actu-
ally intensified as relations between Imperial Japan and the United States devolved towards con-
flict.  The racial and cultural attributes of Japanese Americans and Japanese immigrants bore re-
semblance to the imperialistic goals of Imperial Japan, argued critics of Japanese migration.  
Anti-Japanese sentiment relied on these arguments to explain the danger of Japanese but to also 
term them a military threat.  Without this precondition of Japanese Americans over decades by 
varying members of the anti-Japanese movement, it is plausible that the risk associated with Jap-
anese Americans might not have formulated such a strong following and internment might have 
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never occurred.  Although the logic for this might be potentially too optimistic, the fact remains 
that decades of prejudice put forth by the anti-Japanese community only presented Japanese im-
migrants and Japanese Americans as an enemy force. 
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PART II: THE INADEQUACY OF MILITARY NECESSITY IN EXPLAINING MASS 
JAPANESE AMERICAN INTERNMENT 
 
Introduction  
 
 General DeWitt’s Final Report epitomizes the inherently flawed logic of Japanese Amer-
ican mass internment.  The document attempts to present a verifiable military position capable of 
validating Executive Order 9066 but only serves to confirm the deeply racial reasoning of intern-
ment.  Written in 1943, DeWitt’s report had the potential to detach race from internment and 
support the base argument of the executive order, that of the need for “Successful prosecution of 
the war requires every possible protection against espionage and against sabotage to national-de-
fense.”145  Instead, the report aligned with anti-Japanese rhetoric including issues of loyalty, cul-
ture and how those of Japanese race could not be differentiated between individuals.   The report 
displayed Japanese Americans as though they were caricatures of Dr. Suess’ 1942 drawing; in-
discernibly identical and disloyal threats of fifth column activity.146  Potentially most shocking 
was that John McCloy of the War Department had to make General DeWitt rewrite a first, un-
published version of the Final Report as he considered it difficult to defend in upcoming court 
battles over Japanese American rights.  As stated by Robinson, the document prior to revision 
“stated flatly that he (DeWitt) had ordered racially based evacuation because it was impossible to 
distinguish loyal from disloyal Japanese Americans and that lack of time for hearings had not 
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been a factor in his decision.”147  Indeed, the governmental arguments for Japanese American in-
ternment only proved the inconsistency and racist nature of their position.  Simplistic ideas on 
loyalty and cultural ties to Imperial Japan did not confirm a network of spies or that Japanese 
Americans would assist the Imperial Japanese military.  Review of the evidence presented by ad-
vocates of internment as well as similar situations that did not create the military conditions 
needed for internment solidify the failing of Executive Order 9066 but also the strong effects 
anti-Japanese rhetoric had on Japanese American internment.  Although far from comprehensive, 
these examples help define both the racial and nationalist motivations of the executive order and 
draws away from the government indicated necessity of military intervention.  The connection 
between anti-Japanese rhetoric and military need is best defined by the evolution of prejudice 
seen in part I of this paper.  However, to fully understand that the driving force of this prejudice 
was not in fact a legitimate military concern must also be verified.  
 
 
Niihau Incident 
 
The Niihau Incident is included as a review of military necessity because the United States used 
it as verification of Japanese American disloyalty.  The premise of Japanese American incarcer-
ation depended on proof that Japanese Americans could not be trusted and posed a threat to the 
nation.  This incident, as presented by individuals in support of internment, note both of these sit-
uations occurred.  However, full analysis including review of racial prejudice greatly expands 
this discussion and presents a more holistic view of events. 
 
 
 The Hawaiian island of Niihau, less than eighteen miles from Kauai’s western coast, was 
the site of one of the strangest incidents of the Pacific War.  A single Japanese naval aviator, 
with the help of the three Japanese Americans on the small island, attempted to gain control of 
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the island.  The result of the incident for the anti-Japanese movement was the advancement in 
ideas of wholesale Japanese American disloyalty to the United States.  This perception of wide-
spread disloyalty, backed by years of similar messages from anti-Japanese rhetoric, eased public 
opinion on the argued military necessity of internment.  During their investigation into the inci-
dent, the official United States Navy report by Lieutenant C.B. Baldwin from January 26, 1941 
rebuked the Japanese American participants writing, “The fact that the two Niihau Japanese who 
had previously shown no anti-American tendencies went to the aid of the pilot when Japanese 
domination of the island seemed possible, indicates the likelihood that Japanese residents previ-
ously believed loyal to the United States may aid Japan if further Japanese attacks appear suc-
cessful.”148  The statement indicates the difference between Japanese and Americans on a racial 
basis notwithstanding citizenship as the two “Japanese” noted by the document were in reality 
Japanese Americans.  Using race and the assumed anti-American tendencies of Imperial Japan, 
the United States Navy, as well as the government as a whole, attempted to characterize race as 
the pretense to loyalty and then to associate that to national security. 
 The incident had no true relevance to the attack on Pearl Harbor or the outcome of the 
war as a whole.  Even with the inclusion of Japanese American participation, the incident war-
rants a minor and inauspicious footnote in the annals of history.  Defender of racial profiling, or 
as she calls it ‘threat profiling,' Michelle Malkin uses the incident to indict all Japanese Ameri-
cans of loyalty to the emperor over allegiance to the United States; “The Haradas were neither 
radical nationals nor professional spies.  They were ordinary Japanese Americans who betrayed 
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America by putting their ethnic roots first.”149  Malkin’s book, In Defense of Internment (2004), 
attempted to excuse military confinement of American Muslims during the War on Terrorism us-
ing Japanese American internment as a historical precedent.150  By attempting to justify Japanese 
American internment as a necessity, Malkin argues that identifying individuals on race is logical, 
if not required, to protect the welfare of the nation.  Using these isolated actions of Japanese 
Americans, Malkin advocates for mass internment just as the United States government did in 
1942.  Yet, the tense moments on the ‘forbidden island,’ so named because of its private owner-
ship, gives more to the character of racism and individual action than anything else.  The Japa-
nese Americans on Niihau were acutely aware of their status as Japanese, not Americans, in Ha-
waii.  Historian Eric Muller notes that Japanese Americans were more akin to “native born for-
eigners” than true American citizens.151  If anything, the Navy’s report only confirmed this soci-
etal position built on decades of anti-Japanese arguments by affirming that their race alone was 
their defining characteristic.  The incident on Niihau, proponents of mass internment argued, 
confirmed the presumed disloyalty of Japanese Americans and validated decades of warnings on 
the true nationalistic intent of Japanese Americans; the incident signaled need for military in-
volvement. 
 The attack on Pearl Harbor resulted in a euphoric victory for the Japanese with only 29 
aircraft and crew losses including a Mitsubishi Zero fighter plane piloted by Airman First Class 
Shigenori Nishikichi.152  Damaged during the attack, the aircraft was unable to make the journey 
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back to its carrier Hiryu and crash landed on the ‘forbidden’ and privately owned island of 
Niihau.  Japanese intelligence believed the island to be uninhabited and designated it a rescue 
point for disabled aircraft, with the intent of having a submarine execute the extraction.  The is-
land had been owned by the Robinson family for several generations and they had managed to 
maintain ownership without the general oversight of the territory or the United States.153  Of the 
around 200 inhabitants, the vast majority were natives; 3 individuals were of Japanese de-
scent.154  Aylmer Robinson, the most recent Robinson family owner, lived on the nearby island 
of Kauai and visited the island every Monday.  He was almost the only lifeline to the outside 
world, with the island having no telephones and only one radio; the poorly educated natives lim-
ited connection to society beyond the shores of Niihau was all but entirely restricted to the Rob-
inson family.  Very few had ever left the island.155 
 The events that followed were chaotic.  After his crash landing which had temporarily 
knocked him unconscious, Nishikichi’s military flight documents were confiscated by local na-
tives, starting a five day violent effort to retrieve the information by controlling the island.  Even 
though the pilot’s flight documents contained classified information, the United States already 
had similar reports from other Japanese aircraft lost in the attack, rendering Nishikichi efforts 
moot.  The ultimate result was the death of the pilot and a Japanese American accomplice, the 
shooting of a native of Niihau and the detainment of the other two Japanese individuals involved.  
Indeed, all three racial Japanese on the island assisted in Nishikichi’s efforts to varying levels.  
As the only individuals able to converse with the Japanese solider and being fully cut off from 
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the outside world, Issei (first generation) Ishimatsu Shintani, Nisei Yoshio Harada (second gener-
ation) and his Nisei wife Irene Harada eventually agreed to assist Nishikichi, despite the Haradas 
being American citizens.  Historian Allan Beekman notes the understood limit of Americanness 
in Japanese Americans as it was their Japaneseness that defined them, not their connections to 
America; “The public schools registered the Nikkei (person of Japanese ancestry), born under the 
American flag, as of Japanese nationality.  The authorities exposed the Nikkei, from the cradle 
upward, to the doctrine that they were foreigners in the land of their birth.”156  Much like the 
comments of California State Senator Sharkey, Japanese Americans were innately Japanese first 
even if ‘American-born.’  Not only did Japanese Americans face hostility based on racial as-
sumptions but segregation furthered the gap between Japanese and white Americans.  Japanese 
American oppression was not only the prejudice they faced in everyday life, it was reflected in 
official government policies against them as well.  This distinction informed many opinions 
within the United States government but also many Japanese Americans who felt significant de-
tachment to both the United States and Imperial Japan.157  According to Irene Harada, her hus-
band felt obligated to assist the Japanese pilot due to his cultural upbringing that emphasized 
kindness to outsiders, not his Japanese race.158 
 The chaos on the island of Niihau after Nishikichi efforts to claim the island was mir-
rored across the Hawaiian Islands in the wake of the attack on Pearl Harbor.  For a week, the 
Niihau Incident existed in a bubble unknown to the outside world.  It was not until December 
14th that the United States military arrived on Niihau.  Along with Aylmer Robinson, the mili-
tary relief party included 13 enlisted men and a single officer.  Despite numerous attempts by the 
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people of Niihau to contact the island of Kauai with fires, it was not until the arrival of an island 
native who had escaped Niihau that the precarious situation was understood.159  The command-
ing officer of the relief party was Jack Mizuha, a second generation Japanese American and fu-
ture Supreme Court Justice for Hawaii.  As Mizuha could not speak Japanese himself, another 
second generation Japanese American, Ben Kobayashi, also made the trip to translate.160  
Harada’s treason made early war headlines and still elicits attacks on the character of Japanese 
Americans as demonstrated by Malkin’s book; Mizuha and Kobayshi’s heroism in the face of de-
motion and degradation has been all but forgotten.161  Almost as though validation of the long 
awaited Japanese fifth column, the military highlighted the actions of the Haradas and Ishimatsu 
Shintani (while allowing their own failures to be deflected) to emphasize their own role in con-
tainment of the ‘problem.’  In approaching the events as directly connected to the Japanese race 
and not an isolated incident, the government promoted continued anti-Japanese sentiment and 
ultimately military necessity. 
 Contradictory reactions by Yoshio Harada and Jack Mizuha however underscore the ina-
bility to question ethnic background as a precursor to treacherous activity.  Although the Japa-
nese on Niihau shared a common language with the Japanese pilot, few other commonalities ex-
isted.  Despite this, General DeWitt on the West Coast indicated the impossibility to separate 
friend from foe when referring to Japanese Americans, an argument pointed at race.162  This situ-
ation demonstrates an obvious flaw in that logic.  Elements of time and communication weighed 
heavily in the actions of those involved.  With knowledge of the attack on Pearl Harbor from 
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Nishikichi but no communication with the outside world including the man they were so depend-
ent on, Aylmer Robinson, the Niihauans were left without a problem solver or full understanding 
of their fluid situation.  Conversely, the Japanese pilot Shigenori Nishikichi presented himself as 
a wealth of information and the language barrier allowed his uninhibited influence over the few 
Japanese speakers on the island.  Their evolving situation, including individual experiences in a 
nation that saw their citizenship as a technicality, became more accepting of Nishikichi perspec-
tive with each day and the continued communication gap with Robinson.  Not only was this inci-
dent unsupportive of mass internment under the guise of national security but it continued to re-
gurgitate arguments inspired in anti-Japanese racism.  Leaning heavily on the consensus opinions 
of the anti-Japanese movement, the government attempted to latch onto a singular event to verify 
continued racial connections to military conditions. 
 The Niihau Incident certainly played a role in explaining what the government defined as 
the wartime need for Executive Order 9066.  Although the motivations of the executive order 
was underlined by race, the government attempted to utilize the Niihau Incident to support action 
against Japanese Americans.  Japanese American actions, not race, the government argued, dic-
tated military intervention.  Because of these actions an entire race had to be assumed guilty of 
disloyalty.  The event was highly publicized at the time, especially on the West Coast where ad-
ditional stories of fifth column activity including the Japanese American support of Japanese air-
craft during the attack on Pearl Harbor were presented as documented fact.163  Even one of the 
biggest advocates of civil liberties for all Americans and well known human rights advocate, El-
eanor Roosevelt, “First Lady of the World,” commented to Louis Adamic during a dinner in Jan-
uary 1942 that “some of the Japanese on the Coast have (emphasis by Adamic) been caught as 
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spies of the Japanese government.”  Adamic remarked in his book Dinner at the White House 
(1946) afterward:  
 
 
 
 The general (General John DeWitt), faced with a potential military problem, was dis-
posed to listen to the pressure groups out West who were taking advantage of the war to 
stir up hysteria.  Had that hysteria touched Mrs. Roosevelt during her recent trip to Cali-
fornia?…The chances are that the decision to evacuate the Japanese Aliens and Japanese 
Americans from the Coast - virtually to put them into concentration camps - had already 
been made.164 
 
 
 
Eleanor Roosevelt opposed what she considered to be an oppressive measure in internment.165  
Yet, the hysteria, which included the violence on Niihau and how it was portrayed, appears to 
have even affected the First Lady.  Even as she presented discord in her husband’s policy to in-
tern Japanese Americans, Adamic’s statement grapples with the fact that Mrs. Roosevelt too con-
nected fear of Japanese Americans to national security at least to some extent.166  More so, she 
too had indicated incorrectly that Japanese Americans had failed to maintain loyalty to the 
United States.  The facts presented, in the way they were presented, gave the false impression of 
internment necessity.  Niihau directly contributed to this idea by focusing on singular acts and 
ignoring widespread historical racism but by also blurring self-serving anti-Japanese reports with 
confirmation of fact.  Yet, during this period even government and military actors blatantly lied 
to the public about the Japanese American threat as evidenced by DeWitt’s Final Report.167 
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 Lieutenant Baldwin’s comment, “when Japanese domination of the island seemed possi-
ble,” is telling as well.  The immediate implication of the entire statement relates to Japanese 
American disloyalty, but it delves deeper.  The statement relates to the fears perpetuated for dec-
ades that a few well-placed Japanese Americans were a dire threat to the nation.  Indeed, far 
from spies or trained military soldiers, these American citizens opted for an alliance based only 
on ethnicity just as anti-Japanese figures such as media baron Hurst and writer Homer Lea years 
before had predicted.  Three Japanese Americans, guided by a single Japanese officer, were ca-
pable of ‘domination’ over American territory.  Unlikely as it may sound, little more was needed 
to indicate this possibility to those so long influenced by the ‘Japanese problem’ as a military di-
lemma.  Yet, the ultimate perception of the government followed as Adamic stated “potential 
military concern” faced by the West Coast as though three individuals had verified its need.168   
This prejudice obscured the key elements to Harada’s motivation.  Ultimately, individual circum-
stance determined Harada’s support of the enemy, an act that far from dictated military action 
against all Japanese Americans.  
 
 
Magic Code Breaking and Japanese American Internment   
 
Magic has been presented by modern history revisionists as tangible support that Japanese 
American internment was vital for national defense.  Advocates inevitably appear to connect this 
stream of thought to other situations where they support limitation of civil rights such as the War 
on Terrorism.  However, Magic code breaking is a weak argument for mass Japanese American 
incarceration.  The documents show a Japanese foreign service unequipped and unsuccessful at 
meeting the goals of Tokyo while still attempting to save face in doing so. 
 
 
 Much like the Niihau incident, supporters of internment point to Magic codebreaking as 
viable proof of Japanese American ill intent.  Authors like David Lowman and Michelle Malkin 
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argue that Imperial Japanese diplomatic code verified Japanese American fifth column activity 
and as a result Japanese Americans loyalty to the United States could not be confirmed.  This ar-
gument adds a new slant to the purpose and potential usefulness of Magic code breaking.  With 
the release of classified Magic cables in the late 1970s and early 1980s, World War II historians 
gained a wealth of information on various topics including Japanese American internment.  
Magic code breaking was one of the best sources of American intelligence on Japanese military 
and diplomatic intent before and during the Second World War.  It was invaluable to the Ameri-
can war effort, saving the lives of thousands of individuals and shortening the war.169  In the now 
famous letter sent to Presidential candidate Governor Thomas E. Dewey from Chief of Staff 
General George C. Marshall, the latter remarks in an attempt to silence Dewey’s attempt to re-
visit the attack on Pearl Harbor for political gain, “They (Magic messages) contribute greatly to 
the victory and tremendously to the savings of American lives, both in the conduct of current op-
erations and in looking toward the early termination of the war.”170  Magic contributed to numer-
ous victories on land and at sea by foreshadowing Japanese movements, troop positions and for-
mation capabilities; “We know their strength in various garrisons, the rations and other stores 
continuing available to them, and what is of vast importance, we check their fleet movements 
and the movements of their convoys.”171  The remarks of Marshall solidifies his faith and reli-
ance on Magic as a tool.  Despite this, Magic cannot connect Japanese Americans to the per-
ceived elaborate fifth column of Imperial Japan.  Advocates contend that the messages demon-
strate an active and significant plot against the United States and that the conditions during late 
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1941 and early 1942 dictated military action.  Thus, it is vital to review the messages to deter-
mine their value related to Japanese American internment and consider what, if any, impact this 
intelligence had. 
 David Lowman, as mentioned before, is one of the greatest advocates of Magic’s ability 
to validate the government’s position for Japanese American internment.  As a former intelli-
gence expert for the National Security Agency of the United States, he was a vocal opposing 
view of the 1982 Congressional Hearings on Japanese American internment, whose conclusions 
he considered revisionist in nature.  In his book, Magic, Lowman faults the committee for not 
even reviewing the messages nor connecting what he considered valuable information used by 
leadership on Japanese American Internment.  Although the committee did thoroughly review 
the messages after Lowman’s comments, it certainly marked a failure of the committee that con-
tinues to prompt arguments against their motivations and impartiality to the historical evidence.  
According to Lowman, Magic intelligence entirely explains Japanese American internment as it 
supplies evidence to verify military necessity.  As though confirmation of the anti-Japanese 
movement, who predicted the racial ties of Japanese Americans impossible to overcome, Low-
man argues Magic indicates this connection verifies military intervention as well.  Both Low-
man’s book and his disciple’s, Michelle Malkin, who replicates her argument in light of his own, 
focus almost all their attention on the messages uncovered by the United States between 1940 
and close to the end of 1941.  Their contentions are not comprehensive and do not attempt to re-
view the historical basics of Japanese American prejudice or the continual efforts of politicians, 
the military and the media to establish links between Japanese expansion in the Pacific and Japa-
nese Americans.  Instead they argue within the singular concept of Magic by presenting govern-
mental decisions as unaffected by historical proceedings or context outside of black and white 
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messages.  Whereas most historians on the anti-Japanese movement and internment begin dis-
cussion in the decades before World War II, Lowman and Malkin observe only the months be-
fore Pearl Harbor. 
 The United States began monitoring and decoding classified Japanese signals shortly af-
ter the end of the First World War.  Buoyed by fear of the growing Japanese position in the Pa-
cific, the United States broke Japanese diplomatic and naval codes just prior to the Washington 
Naval Conference in 1921-1922.172  The Japanese diplomatic code at the time, codenamed 
‘RED,’ was replaced in the 1930s by Japanese code ‘BLUE’ and then on the eve of war in Eu-
rope by code ‘PURPLE.,’ an incredibly complicated set of ciphers not cracked by the United 
States until fall of 1940.  By the time of the Pearl Harbor attack, the United States had 700 indi-
viduals working on enemy signal traffic, although only a few of those were actual cryptologists.  
This number was to grow to around 50,000 men and women by 1944, “whether in cryptanalysis 
itself, or in translating, or in evaluating, distributing and applying in action the intelligence 
gained.”173  This exponential growth of American cryptology between 1941 and 1944 was a re-
sult of American espionage’s greatest misstep, its inability to prevent the Pearl Harbor attack.  
 December 7, 1941 dictated through failure the need to reimagine the intelligence network 
of the United States.  Although Magic had provided the circumstantial evidence that an attack on 
Pearl Harbor was possible, if not likely, the warning signs were not heeded.  Historian Ronald 
Lewin notes “Hypersensitivity about security, rigid restrictions as to who ‘needed to know,’ false 
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assumptions about who actually knew” were but a few of the shortcomings.174  Intelligence gath-
ering has inherent flaws.  The achievements of programs like Magic and Ultra, the British ver-
sion of Magic, were significant but not without faults.  When declassified by the United States in 
the late 1970s and through further updates in the 1980s, Magic consisted of over 126,000 mes-
sages.175  This magnitude of information translated to, on average, 50 to 75 messages a day, 
peaking at times to 130 messages a day.176  All ciphers that could be read had to be decoded, 
translated and unknown information surmised.  Not all encrypted text was intercepted or under-
stood and there remained periods when changes in the Japanese codes prevented any interception 
of messages at all. “Looking back at the war Rochefort (United States Navy Captain and Cryp-
tologist) believed that the best average was reading 12 to 15 percent of a Japanese message.”177  
“The gaps,” or the other 85 to 88 percent, “were filled by intuition, back referencing to other sig-
nals and general understanding of the enemy and situation.”178  However educated and informed 
the cryptologists and their hypothesis, it remained at its core, a guess.   
 Critical to the war effort, Magic was a closely guarded secret with few individuals having 
access to the inscriptions.  Not even Federal Bureau of Investigation Director J Edgar Hoover, 
whose group spearheaded foreign intrigue, nor Western Defense Command’s commanding of-
ficer Lt. General DeWitt were apprised of its messages.  Even those closely related to the pro-
gram like Captain Joseph Rochefort and eventual Rear Admiral Edwin T. Layton, Chief Intelli-
gence Officer for Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, worked on 
breaking the code but did not have access to the full information themselves.  General Marshall’s 
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letter to Dewey again underscores how few knew about Magic and even more, the limited influ-
ence it had on front line commanders.  Further, despite the success of signal intelligence at the 
Battle of Coral Sea in early May of 1942, which allowed the overstretched American navy to be 
at the right place at the right time, leadership still believed the intelligence had to be validated.  
With Pearl Harbor still a recent failure of the cryptology, commanders had to regain faith in a 
system they did not fully understand or even have complete knowledge of.  Even more, those 
same commanders had to trust that what was being provided was reliable intelligence and then 
appreciate its implications and still act properly with the knowledge and limited resources early 
in the war.  
 Despite the inherent weaknesses in intelligence gathering, David Lowman’s book Magic 
argues that these specific documents were the crux of the Roosevelt administration’s Executive 
Order 9066.  Notwithstanding the limited knowledge of the project, Lowman states that the ad-
ministration had a full grasp on Imperial Japanese intent based on this information.  Of the thou-
sands of messages decoded by the United States before hostilities erupted in late 1941, several 
have peaked the interests of those supporting Magic’s role in Japanese internment.  Message #44 
of January 30, 1941 is one such message.  Sent from Tokyo to Washington DC, the signal directs 
several priorities for the embassy including the formation of intelligence gathering services 
within the United States.  The message is indicated as verification of necessity by internment 
supporters due to section six which requests the use of “second generation” Japanese Americans 
for intelligence purposes.179  However, there is significantly more to the signal than just this. 
 Section six directs the Japanese foreign office to consider “Utilization of our “Second 
Generations” and our resident nationals.  (In view of the fact that if there is any slip in this phase, 
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our people in the U.S. will be subjected to considerable persecution, and the utmost caution must 
be exercised).”180  Defenders of internment note correctly that ‘second generation’ Japanese 
Americans were at least considered for espionage activity.  Yet, they fail to comment on the im-
portance of section five.  Section five reads “Utilization of U.S. citizens of foreign extraction 
(other than Japanese), communists, Negroes, labor union members, and anti-semites, in carrying 
out the investigations described in the preceding parish would undoubtedly bear the best re-
sults.”181  This section then bears two main points.  First, it clearly states that any minority 
American citizen who is not of Japanese descent would be preferable for Japanese spying.  Sec-
ond, the Japanese were attempting to recruit from groups which already had some contempt or 
disillusionment with the United States.  Indeed, section five confirms that using Japanese Ameri-
cans is not desirable and requested the usage of more clandestine options.  Even section six cau-
tions the use of Japanese Americans.  The embassy also indicates through its preferred usage of 
non-Japanese Americans that they believed Japanese Americans are likely to be less successful 
than other racial groups.  Ultimately the message indicates the need to avoid any action that 
would involve Japanese peoples in espionage and presses the embassy to find other American 
citizens for utilization of the task. 
 This idea of using non-Japanese American citizens is seen again in Message #67 from 
May of 1941.  This signal maintains it is best to use “white persons and Negroes, through Japa-
nese persons whom we can’t trust completely.”182  Although slightly unclear as to why the Japa-
nese person cannot be entirely trusted, the statement still confirms Japanese intent to avoid Japa-
nese persons for these activities.  Further information on the Japanese handler in this situation is 
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unknown, yet it is worth noting that the embassy appears more optimistic in use of white and Af-
rican Americans than Japanese individuals.  The use of African Americans is a common theme 
for the Japanese government as well.  A message from Tokyo in June of 1941 urged for the train-
ing of African Americans as potential fifth columnists but nothing similar was ever indicated re-
garding Japanese Americans.183  Message #67 continues by indicating there are some “absolutely 
reliable Japanese in San Pedro and San Diego.”184  These individuals were to supply information 
on troop and ship movements, but it is unclear if they are Japanese nationals or American citi-
zens or how successful their mission was.  They are also only mediators of information and not 
desired for potential training as fifth columnists.  The Japanese government’s need to categorize 
‘reliable’ Japanese from those that could not be fully trusted further emphasizes the wide gap in 
their understanding of Japanese American loyalty and why they were adamant in using non-Japa-
nese races for espionage.   
 Message #67 does have another revelation in which it indicates the embassy had been in 
“contact" with “second generation” Japanese who were in the United States Army and working 
in airplane plants.185  Contact is assumed to mean for intelligence gathering, but this is an uncer-
tain point as the embassy may have only approached them.  Additionally, from this section it is 
unclear to the number of individuals they are referring to or their position.  No other messages 
surface indicating these individuals or potential intelligence obtained from them, again lending to 
the assumption that they were unsuccessful within this role.  If anything, the continual messages 
requesting recruitment of non-Japanese Americans support they received limited information 
from these groups.  Similarly, the embassy could be overly stating its network in an effort to 
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show its non-existent success to Tokyo.  It can also be viewed from the final paragraph of this 
message that the embassy, through a Japanese national named Nakazawa with the help of both 
Americans and African Americans, was also investigating military and labor movements, not 
Japanese Americans.186  Overall, the message cannot confirm any true risk to the United States. 
 The reliance on American citizens of non-Japanese ancestry and Japanese nationals are 
apparent from the communications.  Message #239 from February 1941 requests that Japanese 
residents be used for intelligence gathering including those who work in the media and cooperate 
business.187  Another communication from May of the same year confirms again that “foreign 
company employees, as well as employees in our own companies here (Seattle, United States)” 
were targeted by the Japanese.  That message also notes that “We are now exerting our best ef-
forts toward the acquisition of such intelligences through competent Americans.”188  As the term 
does not indicate Japanese nationals or “first or second generation” Japanese, the conclusion can 
be drawn this refers specifically to American citizens not of Japanese ancestry.  Several mes-
sages sent to Tokyo from Manila confirm the chief information gatherers were Japanese nation-
als, not Japanese Americans; all messages start similarly, “The following is from a report of a 
Japanese resident in Cebu,” “According to a report handed on to me by a Japanese who has lived 
in the Province of Ilocos Norte…,” “A report given me by a Japanese who resides in Camarines 
Norte.”    All messages provide military assessments of the local area and are supplied to the em-
bassy by Japanese nationals.189  Although potentially useful during conflict, this information was 
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also publicly known during times of peace and generally took little skill to obtain, making it of 
limited value. 
 Although a multitude of messages are specific to isolated situations or needs, themes are 
easy to conceptualize.  The Imperial Japanese Government through their foreign service desired 
intelligence on the political, economic, and military situation in the United States.  This is far 
from unusual for any diplomatic mission.  In planning for the assumed eventual war with the 
United States, they were prepared to move their intelligence apparatus outside of the United 
States and they also were interested in keeping in touch with their nationals, including dual citi-
zenship-holding Japanese Americans, in case of escalation between Japan and the United States.  
Efforts made within the Imperial Japanese embassy and consulates were aimed at supporting an 
eventual war effort and even with this knowledge very few transmissions constitute a serious 
military threat against the United States.  The assumed Japanese fifth column was little more 
than wishful thinking by Tokyo.  
 By looking at the messages themselves we see the Japanese consulate’s desire for fifth 
column activity, but also their overall inability to create a system that could adversely affect the 
United States war effort.  At times, the Japanese embassy even notes their limited funding to pur-
sue intelligence efforts; “Taking into consideration the small amount of funds we have at our dis-
posal, we have decided to deemphasize propaganda for the time being, and instead to strengthen 
our intelligence work.”190  Their continual request for additional intelligence operatives and clar-
ification on important information verifies the perpetual need to improve intelligence but also the 
lacking of the program as a whole.  A May 19, 1941 cipher supports the deficiencies, if not utter 
deterioration, of the embassy’s work:  
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The duties of an intelligence office are becoming increasingly difficult.  Because of the 
existence of the Dies Committee and of the application of the regulations regarding 
Americans in foreign employ and regarding foreigners resident in America the gathering 
of accurate secret information is far from easy.  This is only one example and there are 
many other ‘delicate’ problems.191   
 
 
 
The Dies committee was not fully preoccupied with looking at Japanese Americans but also Ger-
mans and Italians.  Yet, if the imagined Japanese fifth column could be so seriously hampered by 
such a committee, it is hard to imagine its success against organizations like the Federal Bureau 
of Investigations.  Further, the reoccurring theme that it was more likely to see a white or African 
American citizen spying for Japan, by their desire, than someone of Japanese descent remains the 
same.  In the few situations in which Japanese spies were captured almost all were white Ameri-
cans.192  Even messages that refer to Japanese spies are rarely clear on whether they are Japanese 
Americans, Japanese nationals or members of the Japanese diplomatic envoy. 
 Advocates of internment place too much emphasis on a few cryptic Magic messages. The 
idea that the magnitude of Magic messages observed in the context of 1942 America left the 
Roosevelt administration with no choice but to assume national security was at risk is simply not 
true.  In reality those advocating for internment in 1942 were not those informed on Magic, 
meaning their understanding of Japanese American threat could not include this information.  
Above all, the messages do not confirm the existence of a major Japanese American fifth col-
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umn.  Even if the messages did verify a major national security risk, the two month delay of Ex-
ecutive Order 9066 after the attack on Pearl Harbor is far from logical.  As it was, both Low-
man’s and Malkin’s arguments boil down to a handful of messages which desired an intricate 
network of espionage and premised the sheer possibility of a few Japanese American intelligence 
gatherers for Imperial Japan warranted the apprehension and internment of over one hundred 
thousand Americans assumed to be connected.   The Magic: Background of Pearl Harbor (1977) 
consisting of 25,000 messages from February 1941 to December of the same year only divulges 
the terms ‘second generation’ or ‘fifth column’ in 11 messages.193  Whereas Lowman and Mal-
kin had ample time to review the messages in friendly formats and under no pressure, cryptolo-
gists did not have any such luxuries.  Even if these messages were discovered and then for-
warded to the correct authorities on the matter, which is a significant stretch on its own, the few 
total messages and context point not to systematic Japanese espionage but in fact few individual 
spies organized from within the Japanese embassy itself.  From a military perspective, Magic did 
not confirm Japanese Americans on the whole to be agents of Japan or an excessive threat. More 
accurately, this connection was solely made through race on the pretense that nationality, ethnic-
ity and religious connections confirm disloyalty and required military intervention. 
 
Individual versus Mass Detainment of Japanese Americans in the Hawaii Territory 
A key government argument for Japanese American mass internment was assumed Japanese dis-
loyalty and where they lived.  Most all Japanese Americans in 1941 lived on the American West 
Coast or in Hawaii in close proximity to United States strategic locations for the Pacific War.  
These reasons together would appear to dictate equal military necessity against Japanese Ameri-
cans in both regions.  This, however, did not occur.  The following analysis shows that concern 
for Japanese immigrants and Japanese Americans were just as significant in Hawaii as in the 
contiguous United States.  By framing the fault in military necessity logic when looking at Ha-
waii, identification of racist motivations become more transparent.  Japanese Americans were no 
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more a threat in Hawaii than the American mainland and the variation of events support that the 
universal blanket of the Japanese race as a threat is woefully indecisive.  
 
 
 The territory of Hawaii presented the United States with a unique situation regarding Jap-
anese Americans.  When the first Japanese immigrated to Hawaii in 1868 as laborers for the 
sugar cane plantations, it was not anticipated that 46 years later that population would have ex-
panded to 160,000 people.  From the 148 men, women and children that first arrived in 1868194 
would grow the largest majority ethnic group in the Hawaiian islands at almost 40 percent the 
total population in 1940.195  By comparison, in 1930 California, people of Japanese ancestry 
made up two and one-tenth percent of the population of the state.196  Unified resistance to Japa-
nese Americans in California from both political entities and many media outlets stressed their 
ability to propagate at a higher rate threatening the white homogeny of the state.197  However un-
reasonable this was for California, the ability of Japanese Americans to gain influence and sub-
stantial voting control appeared a reality to many white land owners in the islands of Hawaii.  
This served to promote a militant stance by those opposed to Japanese American influence along 
racial lines of the anti-Japanese movement.  Leaders of Hawaii, but also the United States, saw 
Japanese Americans as a threat and a potential enemy.  Despite this, no mass internment in Ha-
waii occurred.  Instead, martial law was implemented and those that were believed disloyal were 
interned on an individual basis, proving the conditions for military confinement of Japanese 
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Americans did not exist.  Veritably, the civil liberties of citizens in Hawaii disintegrated as a re-
sult of martial law.  However, there was no racial discrepancy in martial law supporting race 
alone was not a prerequisite to confinement.  
 Japanese laborers were targeted by Hawaiian sugar cane plantation owners in the late 
nineteenth century into the early twentieth century as a replacement for Chinese labors.  After the 
Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, Japanese citizens began to move to the islands in increasing 
numbers.198  The economy of Hawaii was defined by sugar, and almost all ownership was held 
by the ‘Big Five.’  This “financial oligarchy”199  made up the “agents for thirty-six of the terri-
tory’s thirty-eight sugar plantations during the 1930s,” allowing for 90 percent of all Hawaiian 
product to be controlled through them.200  “The Big Five also controlled businesses associated 
with the sugar plantations, including banking, insurance, transportation, utilities and wholesale 
and retail merchandising.  Through interlocking directorates, intermarriages, and social associa-
tions, the haole, or white elite managed to keep the wealth within a small circle of families.”201  
Much like a slave-master relationship, the contracts between Japanese laborers and their employ-
ers were governed by the Masters and Servants Act; the Big Five endeavored to maintain abso-
lute dominion over the Hawaiian economy and their imported labor.202  As stated by the Hawai-
ian Sugar Plantation Association secretary Royal D. Mead in 1910, “the Asiatic has had only an 
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economic value in the social equation…his presence is no more felt than is that of the cattle on 
the ranges.”203 
 Japanese migrants, much to the dismay of their employers, were not satisfied with the sta-
tus quo established by the island’s oligarchy.  Mead’s words might have attempted to indicate the 
desired social and economic position of the imported workers, however, strikes suggest they 
posed many more problems than did the island’s livestock.  When looking at Japanese American 
history in Hawaii, it is vital to understand the significant unrest that came well before the Second 
World War and how that differed from the mainland United States.  Although the anti-Japanese 
movement unified a great number of individuals and groups opposed to Japanese Americans, 
within Hawaii Japanese and Japanese Americans faced a united front controlled by the island’s 
oligarchy.  This group, well before mass internment of Japanese Americans on the United States 
West Coast, visualized Japanese labor in Hawaii as a singular entity; whereas General DeWitt 
noted the inability to differentiate disloyal and loyal Japanese Americans, government in Hawaii 
assumed a disloyalty due to group mentality long before 1942.  Further, the necessity of Japanese 
labor on the islands gave them greater leverage when organizing work stoppage, which in turn 
developed hostile, often military reactions.  Sugar plantation need for Japanese laborers therefore 
allowed for more latitude in pursuit of rights but also invoked immense anti-Japanese fear and 
opposition understood within racial groups.  Labor unrest became a common and contentious 
theme which eventually drew military interest, and numerous reports from military intelligence 
confirm fear of Hawaiian Japanese Americans was rampant.  Initially, this fear stemmed from 
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their ability to disrupt the economy but over time, with the growth of the population, the angst 
shifted toward concerns of power and control. 
 Between 1890 and 1900, no less than twenty insurrections occurred by Japanese laborers, 
many of which involved numerous individuals and sometimes organized protests, even if they 
failed to be sustained or effective in improving the Japanese position.204  Although relatively mi-
nor, these disputes became a growing trend.  Lessons learned were reapplied more effectively in 
other disputes, with the Japanese laborers becoming more organized and their demands economi-
cally strategic.  By 1904 a single walk out consisted of over 1,200 workers, shutting down an en-
tire plantation and the 1909 strike had over four times the participants than five years before.205  
Although several other strikes occurred after 1909, the 1920 strike represented a more solidified 
Japanese community approach to labor issues through American ideals.  The strike itself was not 
limited to people of Japanese lineage but included Filipino, Puerto Rican and Spanish workers as 
well.  In all, over 8,300 workers, or 77 percent of the workforce of Oahu, struggled to “safeguard 
their livelihood against the tyranny and encroachments of capitalists.”206  Continued class revolt 
had significant effects on the Japanese population but also on how they were perceived by the 
white population.   
 Although success was limited to minor victories, the motivations of Japanese movements 
became only outmatched by the strength of the plantation and governmental response.  Work 
stoppages in 1904, 1905, 1909 and 1920 elicited strong reactions from the ‘Big Five’ with the 
support of the military.  After the 1905 riots, a federal commissioner of labor unapologetically 
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called the action a race conflict and not one of class conflict although not only Japanese were in-
volved; “(Japanese laborers) do not feel any hostility toward employers or capitalists as a class… 
(but by) intense race solidarity and the powerful influence over the workers exercised by such 
organizations as they possess.”207  The government defined the actions by the Japanese as “blood 
unionism,” a description that disallowed their actions to be seen as common desires of working-
men but those of a unified and hostile force.208  This force, unsurprisingly, was understood by 
their racial makeup.  The military reaction bears this fact.  In addition to over 100 armed police 
officers from several municipalities, the governor requested the National Guard, which arrived 
armed with rifles and field artillery in 1905.  Whereas laborers were unarmed and identified their 
purpose based on class, the territorial government viewed the the disruption as race based.209  
Labor disputes during the period in the United States generally drew a strong armed response 
that supported business owners yet these generally were considered class conflict, not race con-
flict as with Japanese in Hawaii. 
 Even more disturbing, during the 1920 revolt the military took it upon itself to aid planta-
tion owners on their own initiative.  Military intelligence documents during the early 1920s like 
the “Estimate of the Japanese Situation as it Affects the Territory of Hawaii, From the Military 
Point of View” and “Summerall Report” note that Japanese labor disputes were secondary in 
concern to racial conflict and the military judged Japanese under this view.210  As plantation 
owners had been able to curtail the 1909 uprising with the use of other minority labor groups as 
‘scabs,' the governor decided against a show of force as had been done in 1905.  Despite this 
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more docile approach from the territorial authority, army officers connected directly with planta-
tion management and requested any updates if an “emergency” arose out of the strike.211  The 
underlying message was clear; the military saw Japanese labor movements as an extension of an 
elaborate ‘invasion’ and intended to direct a military response.  Anti-Japanese writer Homer Lea 
had noted the likelihood of Japanese ‘invasion’ of the islands and the military’s response ap-
peared in line with his dramatic conclusions.212  Numerous other military intelligence reports 
during the 1920s and 1930s also presented Japanese Americans as a well-organized threat.  La-
bor disputes had little to do with the rights of the island’s lowest class and their semi-slavery 
conditions in the eyes of the military establishment and were instead to the eventual takeover of 
the island by the Japanese.  As noted in the Pride of Palomar the goal was the installation of nu-
merous ‘little Japans;’ “It means that literally a slice of Japan has been transplanted in La Questa 
Valley…And it is lost to white men!”213   An editorial in the Pacific Commercial Advertiser in 
1905 elaborates on those fears stating “The peril is obvious…considerable fear was felt at first 
by some of the white residents on account of the violence and the collision between the police 
and the Japanese, and it was felt that in the face of the overwhelmingly Asiatic population the 
whites were in some danger.”214  The peril lie not with soldiers armed with rifles and cannons 
but from the ‘overwhelming’ Asiatic population.  The danger was not in minor violent outbreaks, 
but the persistently believed threat of a Japanese ‘invasion’ of the island.  
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 The local newspapers of Hawaii sold the idea of Japanese ill desires on the islands.  In 
1920 the Pacific Commercial Advertiser was again stoking the fires of the anti-Japanese move-
ment; “What we face now is an attempt on the part of an alien race to cripple our principal indus-
try and to gain dominance of the American Territory of Hawaii.”215  Another periodical, the 
Honolulu Star-Bulletin concluded that “This is what we meant in declaring that back of the strike 
is a dark conspiracy to Japanize this American territory.”216  Far from individuals interested in 
creating a better life for themselves and their family, the Star-Bulletin believed there was a cyni-
cal ploy by the nation of Japan to embed hostile individuals and that labor revolt was the embry-
onic state that led to wholesale Japanese domination.   Labor disputes primed not only the ‘Big 
Five’ and the media for an argument for military reaction, but also the military itself.  These ac-
tions and beliefs by the military and government clearly denote their racial understanding of Jap-
anese and Japanese Americans and how this connected to military themes.  Further, based on the 
continual concern of dispute and riot, it set conditions even more toward military resolution, al-
lowing the military to formulate strategies of internment in the decades before the Second World 
War.217 
 Hawaii must also be viewed with its geographical location in mind.  Hawaii was signifi-
cantly closer to Imperial Japan and its ever growing Pacific empire than was the American West 
Coast, making it an important crossroads for political development.  Homer Lea impressed the 
island’s importance to the mainland United States in The Valor of Ignorance stating: 
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If this Republic had created at any time a great naval and military base in Hawaii, Japan’s 
opportunity of seizing the islands would have been lessened if not prohibited; and so long 
as these islands formed an invulnerable American base, the mainland of the Republic 
would be removed from the sphere of military enterprise.  While the establishment of 
American naval and military power in the Pacific or Hawaii has not been attempted, yet 
Japan has prepared for this eventuality in so effective a manner that, notwithstanding what 
the naval forces of the United States may be in the future, these islands can be seized from 
within and converted into a Japanese naval and military base so quickly that they will be 
impregnable to the power of this Republic, regardless of what it may be on the main-
land.218 
 
 
 
Not only does the text stress the vital importance of the islands, but it attempts to foretell how the 
Japanese were prepared to conquer Hawaii ‘from within.’  Included as well is the concept of Ha-
waii being the door to America; whoever controlled these islands could dictate their desires on 
the American mainland.  When combined with the large Japanese population and numerous labor 
disputes, Hawaiian Japanese Americans, in the mind of the anti-Japanese movement, had to be 
seen as a threat beyond even that of Japanese Americans in California.  Despite this, mass intern-
ment did not occur in the islands, indicating the military necessity to do so did not exist.  
 After the attack on Pearl Harbor, the United States invoked martial law in Hawaii but did 
not pursue mass internment.  Within hours of the conclusion of the attack, the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (with help from local authorities) began rounding up local Japanese identified as 
dangerous or potential fifth columnists.  The majority of these individuals were community lead-
ers such as religious, education or Japanese cultural figures.219  These groups, it was believed, 
had long supported the continual tie to Japan and assisted in the unassailability of Japanese 
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Americans.  American media supported these actions and continued to present Japanese Ameri-
cans as the enemy.  The LA Times in their December 8, 1941 publication announced, “We have 
thousands of Japanese here and in light of yesterday’s demonstration that treachery and double-
dealing are major Japanese weapons.”220  By December 8, 391 Japanese aliens and Japanese 
Americans living in Hawaii were in custody, many of these were from the ‘ABC’ list of poten-
tially dangerous individuals created after President Roosevelt’s 1936 comment that “every Japa-
nese citizen or non-citizen on the Islands of Oahu who meets these Japanese ships (arriving in 
Hawaii) or has any connection with their officers or men should be secretly but definitely identi-
fied and his or her name be placed on a special list of those who would be the first to be placed in 
a concentration camp in the event of trouble.”221  Ultimately over 1,200 people of Japanese an-
cestry were interned in Hawaii, of which the majority were American citizens.  German and Ital-
ian citizens were also apprehended and interned in less significant numbers, including a German 
national who had actively spied on the United States Navy for years solely for Japanese benefit, 
Otto Kuehn.222  
 Martial law had been proposed as a potential military solution to the ‘Japanese problem’ 
well before 1941 but became active for the first time only hours after the Pearl Harbor attack.  It 
would remain in effect for the next 3 years till October 1944, well after the Japanese military 
held any likelihood or ability to invade the islands.  Martial law suspended the writ of habeas 
corpus, imposed a curfew and maintained blackouts on the island, all under the control of the 
military.  Thousands of Japanese citizens and Japanese Americans alike were investigated by the 
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United States and some were tried in provost courts.  Courts were held as military tribunals out-
side of civil procedures and lacked most protections granted by the United States Constitution 
including legal representation, jury trials and the ability to appeal.  The system was designed for 
enemy combatants and those tried were at the full mercy of the military.  Provost courts held be-
tween 55,000-120,000 trials during the war, of which thousands were for Japanese Americans.223  
However, relatively few of these trials were for serious offenses and only a handful were related 
to issues of sabotage or espionage and none of those were for Japanese.224  No one of Japanese 
ancestry is known to have been convicted of disloyalty to the United States, although several 
were implicated in these activities including Irene Harada and Ishimatsu Shintani, as the surviv-
ing Japanese members of the Niihau Incident.225  Neither one of them were tried for their actions 
on the island of Niihau.  Without question, martial law had negative effects on the population of 
Hawaii during the war years.  Yet, the imposition of martial law in Hawaii was based on equal-
ity; that is, it applied to everyone on the islands without concern for race.  DeWitt’s Final Report 
confirmed that race had been the determining factor in evaluation and internment on the West 
Coast of the United States, although it could be argued that the greater threat of potential Japa-
nese fifth column activity was in Hawaii.   
 The cases represented that issues of disloyalty were handled on an individual basis and 
although under military tribunal, defendants still maintained some, however limited, protections.  
Individuals were not interned for their race but instead on their transgressions.  The islands con-
tained a Japanese American population larger than the mainland, making up a significant portion 
of the overall population in the area most likely at threat of Japanese aggression, and yet the 
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same necessities seen on the mainland did not apply here.  DeWitt’s report had stated that the 
Imperial Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor included “positive enemy knowledge of our patrols, 
our naval dispositions, etc., on the morning of December 7th,” only possible through Japanese 
American intelligence and yet the extreme measures of the American West Coast were not seen 
as necessary in Hawaii.226  Although cities like Los Angeles and Seattle were vital for American 
wartime efforts in the Pacific, they were not as significant as Hawaii.  All of these locations had 
highly condensed Japanese American populations near military installations and vital war pro-
duction areas and yet it was only cities in the mainland that were deemed military zones and thus 
evacuated.  The government had planned to pursue full scale Japanese American internment in 
Hawaii.227  Wholesale internment was eventually seen as unpractical in Hawaii and those indi-
viduals believed to be of concern were thus detained. 
 The juxtaposition between Hawaii and the West Coast underscores the issues of intern-
ment being a military necessity.   The justification of internment dealt with the clear threat of 
Japanese Americans as fifth columnists and their inability to be seen as individuals.  This long 
held but fictitious and highly sensationalized idea was supported as fact by the United States.  
Rumors of Japanese Americans cutting crops to direct Japanese aircraft in Hawaii and making 
signals via radio and light to signal ships attacking the US mainland, however false, found a wide 
and gullible audience.228  These stories added to a myriad of additional reasons that internment 
was found acceptable and deemed a necessity.  These explanations were presented as reality in 
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both areas and ultimately dictated varied reactions.  Had the military threat been justified in Cali-
fornia, Oregon and Washington, how could Hawaii not be included in similar governmental ac-
tion?  In addition, the idea that a population is too big to wholesale intern has its merit from a 
feasibility standpoint, however, it remains a separate issue from military necessity.  The Japanese 
American population in Hawaii was realistically too large for wholesale internment from a logis-
tical standpoint yet that does not therefore determine whether it was needed.  If internment on the 
West Coast was required, in and of itself no small task, then so would have internment in Ha-
waii; the economic and political difficulties does not alleviate the necessity.  National defense 
against the ‘Japanese problem’ simply failed to verify the portion of internment in any region.   
 Popular consensus pushed by the anti-Japanese movement incorporated the Japanese race 
as a direct military threat to the United States.  In many ways it formed the basis of Japanese 
American internment by creating an atmosphere conducive to verifying its own position.  And 
yet, Hawaii remained an outlier where the racial motivations of military necessity could not 
trump appeasement to economic need.229  Ironically, numerous Japanese Americans took up the 
role of protecting their homeland while at the same time Japanese Americans on the American 
West Coast were assumed dangerous.  The idea of American citizens, trained within the national 
guard or territorial guard, proceeding to take up arms and defend their nation seems expected, 
even natural within the American value system, but when Hawaiian Americans of Japanese an-
cestry did so after Pearl Harbor they were armed by a government who had noted their potential 
threat as fifth columnists for decades.  The government, through numerous reports over the 
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years, had identified Japanese Americans as a ‘menace’ and military threat.  A 1922 Federal La-
bor Commission noted “Hawaii may have its labor problems and the Commission believes these 
problems can be solved from time to time as the emergency arises, but we believe that the ques-
tion of National Defense and the necessity to curtail the domination of the alien Japanese in 
every phase of the Hawaiian life is more important than all the other problems combined.”230   
 In the pivotal moment when needed most, when headlines all over the United States sen-
sationalized the threat of Japanese Americans, they stepped up.  On December 7, 1941 over 300 
men from the Hawaiian territorial guard went into service; many of these young men were Japa-
nese Americans.231  They were armed and placed at strategic locations throughout the islands in-
cluding, according to their commander, telephone exchanges, electric substations, the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation office who had coined them “a source of potential danger,”232 court-
houses, wells, reservoirs, pumping stations, water tanks, bridges and state institutions such as the 
territorial archives and governor’s residence, Washington Place.233  At the same moment that 
Japanese Americans on the island of Niihau were offering assistance to a Japanese officer, a sig-
nificantly more substantial number of Japanese Americans were confirming their unwavering 
support for their nation of birth.  Ted Tsukiyama, a Japanese American sergeant in the ROTC, 
indicates right after the attack that: 
 
 
 
They called us out into our units, and our unit was captained by Nolle Smith, the black 
guy, and I was first sergeant, and I don’t know if was then that we got the tin hats but an-
yway we got rifles with ammunition and the first order or assignment we got was that 
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Japanese paratroopers landed on top of St. Louis Heights and that we were to deploy and 
await the advice of the enemy…They knew that 80 percent of that ROTC was Japanese.  
They didn’t ask questions.  They didn’t give us a loyalty oath, you know.  They didn’t 
interview us, screen us.  They just said turn out, and we turned out.  And the HTG - same 
thing.234 
 
 
 
 Japanese Americans rose to the challenge presented by war with Imperial Japan.  It 
seemed hardly a question for many including Akira Otani.  After having watched his father’s ar-
rest at gun point by Federal Bureau of Investigation and military agents, he immersed himself in 
his patriotic oath to protect the United States.  “I think I must have felt, gee, my country needs 
me, you know…And today, when you think about it, I think my kids must think I’m a stupid per-
son or whatever.  Here, to see your dad get taken away and turn right around and volunteer for a 
country that took your dad away.”235  Men like Otani demonstrated loyalty in the face of racism 
only to be labeled by their own government an indistinguishable and disloyal mass. 
 The lack of mass internment in Hawaii questions the motivations of Executive Order 
9066.  The ‘Japanese problem’ was centered on the inability of Japanese Americans to deviate 
from their racial ties to Imperial Japan.  Disloyalty was assumed as the essence of what made up 
a Japanese individual could not be altered by citizenship; as argued by DeWitt, there were no 
“means existing for determining the loyal and the disloyal.”236  Hawaii illustrated those limita-
tions by disagreeing with internment of all Japanese Americans.  The stories of Japanese Ameri-
can veterans in Hawaii are surely worth noting as it confirms the superficial extent of racism in 
the face of desperation.  The United States could overlook the presumed disloyalty of Japanese 
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Americans in light of potential Imperial Japanese attack if it preserved the status quo.  Michelle 
Malkin argued that preservation of the Union has to come before individual freedom and rights; 
that civil liberties are not sacrosanct.237  This idea seems fluid dependent on circumstance how-
ever.  The lack of Japanese American internment in Hawaii indicates that survival of the nation 
comes before military necessity as well.  Otherwise how can those deemed potential enemies and 
interned in California be so vital for defense in Hawaii?  The military powers approved in Execu-
tive Order 9066 took on authority unsupported by facts but it also did so under false pretense of 
racial understandings.  
 
German Fifth Column Activity 
Did potential Japanese American fifth column activity outweigh that of German Americans?  
Evaluation of national security is relevant to understand the potential of both Imperial Japan 
and Nazi Germany.  The reality appears to correlate with race expectations.  Nazi Germany was 
a significant threat but German Americans as a ‘white’ race were a part of accepted American 
society whereas Japanese Americans were of a foreign and hostile race which had no common-
ality with American values. 
 
 The lack of wholesale Japanese American internment in Hawaii despite historical con-
cerns about Japanese American labor and geography unequivocally denies the reasoning of mili-
tary necessity.   So too does the lack of similar treatment for German Americans further question 
the military necessity of Japanese American internment.  Although the German American popu-
lation was massive (first or second generation German Americans made up at least five million 
people out of the 132 million people living in the United States) and had established themselves 
within North America well before the twentieth century, the threat must be considered based on 
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the same principles as Japanese Americans.238  According to the official government report in 
1943, factors such as race, population and history in the United States were not the concern of 
internment and as such, only the true fifth column potential, or disloyalty, should be reviewed on 
its individual merits.  A 1942 United States military intelligence survey speculated that one in ten 
German born Americans would turn disloyal to the United States and worse, that a large group of 
German Americans were likely to be “opportunists ready to leap on the Hitler bandwagon…if it 
appears that the Axis is going win the war.”239  The survey suggests that Germans posed just as 
much a threat, if not more so, than did Japanese Americans by sheer numbers and that loyalty, 
even with significant integration into the American way of life, could not be guaranteed.    
 The First World War further confirms the historical concerns of German fifth column ac-
tivity.  Imperial German intelligence services planted numerous spies within the United States 
and took significant interest in the military production industry during the conflict.  Imperial 
German intrigue had potential roles in around fifty unexplained fires at military warehouses and 
armament factories between 1914 and 1916.240  Although definitive proof was never found in 
these situations, abundant circumstantial evidence pointed to Imperial German sabotage plaguing 
the American military production industry.241  During a period that American military writers 
like Mahan proposed Imperial Japan was more of a threat than Imperial Germany, the latter was 
actively harming the United States.  No single event illustrated the effectiveness of Imperial Ger-
man sabotage more than the attack on Black Tom Island in New Jersey.  On July 30, 1916, a 
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massive explosion rocked the New York metro when over 2 million tons of explosives and am-
munition were purposely ignited by saboteurs attempting to cripple the American war effort.  
The blast that killed four people could be heard as far away as Philadelphia and shattered win-
dows in adjacent Brooklyn while even leaving damage to the iconic Statue of Liberty.242  With-
out question Imperial German operations were performed by American citizens, however, their 
actions were confronted by federal law enforcement agencies using non-military methods.  Due 
to race, the methodology of handling legitimate German American intrigue versus perceived Jap-
anese American fifth column actions differed greatly.  
 Unsurprisingly, the interwar period saw continual German efforts to infiltrate the United 
States through various groups.  The German American Bund was an organization that concerned 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation in the late 1930s.  Comments like that of leader Fritz Kuhn in 
a 1938 speech help confirm this interest: 
 
 
 
The German American Voksbund is inspired with the National Socialist world concept.  
We desire that the spiritual rebirth of the German people at home shall spiritually be 
transmitted to the Germans of America through mediums of flaming words and inspiring 
examples.  We must leave nothing undone to gain access to the hearts and minds of our 
fellow German Americans.  We will foster understanding for our homeland convert our 
American fellow citizens into true friends of the present-day Germany.243 
 
 
 
The bund was a successor to an organization called Friends of New Germany, which had been 
started by the Nazi government in Germany to promote national socialist ideas in the United 
States.  When official Nazi Germany sanctioning ended for Friends of New Germany in late 
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1935 the group broke up allowing the German American Bund to pick up the pro-fascist banner 
in March of 1936.  Although the bund itself suggested membership of over 200,000, at its peak 
close to 25,000 ethnic Germans participated in the group.244  They held numerous parades and 
rallies as well as sponsoring the establishment of several recreational camps mostly on the East 
Coast of the United States.245  Although thousands of Japanese Americans maintained connec-
tions to Japanese cultural groups, few, if any, maintained as strong or as visible a following as 
did American pro-Nazi groups. 
 The German American Bund’s most famous rally was their February 1939 ‘Pro-America’ 
rally held in New York City’s Madison Square Garden.  Over 22,000 people attended and 
watched Fritz Kuhn proudly call George Washington America’s first fascist while ridiculing cur-
rent President Roosevelt.246  Tensions ran high outside of the rally as well, and 2,000 New York 
City Police officers were called in to maintain order while 3,000 members of the bund’s security 
force, the Ordungs-Dienst, scuffled with protesters around the arena.247  Although the bund at-
tempted to illustrate a connection with the Nazi government in Germany, they found little sup-
port and after the United States’ entrance into the war, were disbanded.  The German American 
Bund was not a sanctioned Nazi Germany fifth column, but rather an organic one as Japanese 
Americans were assumed to be.  Despite this, there was little doubt of their intent to support the 
Nazi German government in any capacity necessary.  This proclivity toward action is clearly 
noted by German national Bernhard Borgardt, writing in the German newsletter Deutscher 
Weckruf and Beobachter in 1939:  
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In Germany one knows well that there where real German fellows and upright German 
women are ready to work for Germany abroad, this will can be translated into action and 
the country (the United States) can be snatched from Chaos…Germany stands irrevoca-
bly committed to its new times and its gigantic idea: NATIONAL SOCIALISM (Bor-
gardt emphasis): The home land greets you, fellow countrymen! Stand firm and hold out 
in the storm.  Close the ranks and tie the strap of your helmets tighter - for yourselves and 
your beautiful country.248 
 
 
 
 Even though the German American Bund was not authorized directly by the Nazi govern-
ment as had the Friends of New Germany been, this did not mean they were not actively pursu-
ing fifth column activity within the United States.  Both the Rumrich and Duquesne spy rings il-
lustrate this point.  The Rumrich spy ring was a debacle for both the United States and Nazi Ger-
many.  In 1938, Guenther Gustav Rumrich, an American citizen born in Chicago, availed his ser-
vices to the German government after deserting the United States Army.  Rumrich claimed to 
have intelligence in several areas of interest to the Germans and insisted he had the ability to as-
certain more.  After a few minor intelligence victories, including information easily obtained by 
the public, the Germans connected him with a handler who assigned other targets to Rumrich.  
Eventually, British Intelligence caught wind of Rumrich, who was communicating with German 
intelligence through mail directed to an outpost in Scotland, and alerted the Americans.  Rumrich 
was captured shortly after attempting to forge American passports and promptly turned over the 
names of fifteen German agents.  The United States proceeded to misuse the information allow-
ing all but four of the spies to escape the country.249  Although Rumrich proved woefully inade-
quate in his task, his capture confirmed German interest in American aircraft and ship design as 
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well as defensive plans on the Eastern seaboard.  It also showed that the Nazi government had a 
vast network of intelligence gatherers that included American citizens. 
 The collapse of the Duquesne spy ring further illustrated the frequency of German spies 
within the United States.  Duquesne was no more successful than Guenther Rumrich as both suf-
fered from poor German personnel recruitment.  Nazi officials approached William Sebold, a 
naturalized American citizen who had served in the German Army during the First World War, 
in 1939 when visiting family in Germany.  Fearing for his family’s safety, Sebold agreed to work 
with the Nazis to gather intelligence in the United States but then immediately turned himself 
over to American authorities, becoming a double agent.  Sebold came into contact with the 
leader of the New York City cell, Frederick Duquesne, who was actively planning attacks on in-
dustrial plants.  Mimicking some of the successful bombings during World War I, Duquesne’s 
group of spies planned on creating fires near the plants which would lead to larger explosions.  
Through Sebold, the FBI became aware of all these plots and eventually apprehended 33 opera-
tives just prior to Pearl Harbor.  Of note, 26 of the 33 individuals tried and convicted of espio-
nage were American citizens.250   
 The single act that best demonstrated German ability to infiltrate the United States as a 
legitimate fifth column threat was Operation Pastorius.  Whereas Japanese Americans had been 
termed an ‘invasion' from within by some in the early twentieth century, a group of 12 men came 
onto American shores in New York and Florida in 1942 literally as invaders in German military 
uniforms.251  Trained in Germany as saboteurs, the men, led by George Dasch, had all previously 
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lived in the United States and volunteered to perform sabotage to the American defense indus-
tries as far into the heartland as Kentucky and Missouri.  A trend among German spies, two of 
the men were American citizens, one of which, Ernest Peter Burger, had served in the Michigan 
National Guard during the 1930s.252  Landing in the United States from U-boats in June of 1942, 
the Germans failed to do any damage before the mission leader Dasch surrendered himself to 
American authorities only days after their arrival.  The outcome of the dangerous mission was an 
abysmal failure.  Ultimately all men faced trail and all but Dasch and Burger were executed for 
espionage.  This event halted further German attempts to place operatives on American soil until 
1944.253  Even though both the 1942 and 1944 plots failed to inflict harm on the American de-
fense network, the saboteurs still were able to move freely and easily through the nation with as-
sistance from other German Americans not involved but aware of their activities.   
 Situations like this required careful consideration on which coast was most vulnerable to 
attack.  Attorney General Francis Biddle in his memoirs believed the East Coast was more likely 
a threat to fifth column activities than was the West Coast.  “There was more reason in the west 
to conclude that shore-to-ship signals were accounting for the very serious submarine sinking all 
along the East Coast, which were sporadic only on the West Coast…But decisions were not 
made on the logic of events or on the weight of evidence, but on the racial prejudice that seemed 
to be influencing everyone.”254   Military necessity for Biddle appeared more apt to apply in con-
fronting German Americans than Japanese Americans while his comments further confirm issues 
of race informed most decisions.  His comments on the U-boat threat is well founded as well.  
                                                 
252 Dobbs, 17. 
253 Ibid, 87-151. 
254 Robinson, By Order of the President: FDR and the Internment of Japanese Americans, 112. 
  106 
Between January and the end of July 1942, German vessels along the East Coast and in the Car-
ibbean Sea had accounted for 226 merchant ships, culminating in the loss of 1,252,650 tons.255  
By comparison, Japanese submarines sunk seven vessels from Hawaii to the West Coast and 
damaged four more from December 1941 to the end of 1942.  They also shelled an oil refinery 
near Santa Barbara, California and released explosive balloons which killed six American civil-
ians in Oregon.256 
 Between the two failed spy rings and Operation Pastorius, Germany had shown its im-
mense desire to adversely affect the American ability to conduct war.  Regardless of outcome, 
Germany had shown a potential for fifth column activity not seen by any other nation against the 
United States.  Imperial Japan, assumed an internal threat for decades, produced no such fifth 
column attempts.  According to Historian Francis MacDonnell, “In contrast to the case of the 
Nazi Fifth Column, there is little evidence that Roosevelt felt grave concern at the menace posed 
by a Trojan horse directed from Tokyo.”257  Yet, so extreme was the fear of Japanese Americans 
that they were forced to evacuate the American West Coast while German Americans continued 
to work in defense factories, in war planning and even actively fought against their ethnic coun-
terparts.  German Americans deemed a viable military risk were interned individually; Japanese 
Americans were forced into internment for substantially different reasons. 
 Whereas Magic messages indicate that the Japanese government might have had one in-
dividual within the United States aerospace industry while attempting to pursue additional indi-
viduals for this purpose, Germany had multiple high ranking individuals in the Duquesne spy 
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ring alone.  Everett Minster Roeder was one such example who “was a draftsman and designer of 
confidential materials for the United States Army and Navy.”258  The juxtaposition between the 
two support that Japanese efforts to recruit non-Japanese Americans were likely their best oppor-
tunity.  The large population of German Americans clearly was an advantage to German espio-
nage efforts and additional evidence indicate a level of success, at least in terms of infiltration, 
never realized by the Japanese government.  The willingness of numerous American citizens of 
German ancestry to support the Nazi German government in fifth column acts dwarfs similar 
Japanese efforts.  If the evidence is examined based on credibility of threat alone, German efforts 
present a more plausible need for military intervention than does those of the Japanese.   
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CONCLUSION 
 
 The study of Japanese American internment is unique within American history.  Alt-
hough this document argues that the racism toward Japanese Americans was categorically differ-
ent than prejudice faced by others, attempts to establish or to preserve white homogeny is not 
new.  The suffering of Native Americans and African Americans, among others, paints an Amer-
ican history set apart from its idealistic ideology.  Yet, the oddity of Japanese American intern-
ment is in their assumed militaristic threat and lack of loyalty due to race and nationalism.  US 
Rear Admiral Yates Stirling in 1932 asked whether or not Japanese Americans could “truly ef-
face their allegiance to Japan and adopt full loyalty to a nation so different in historical back-
ground” as the United States.259  Japanese Americans were presented as a future threat because 
they could possibly become one, not because they were one at the time.  Their ancestry and com-
mon culture presented through nationalism with Imperial Japan, not actual treason, was pre-
sumed to indicate disloyalty and potential criminality.  The government response, wholesale in-
ternment of over 100,000 citizens set apart by race, developed as a result of long term anti-Japa-
nese prejudice separate from a shared concept of racism or ‘yellow peril’ by nationalism.  The 
movement’s rhetoric argued in terms of national security and aligned Japanese Americans with a 
potential military enemy in Asia.  
 Therefore, this is why the type of racism endured by Japanese Americans is so important 
to the study of Japanese American internment.  Racism as a single entity of reason cannot encap-
sulate all prerequisites of internment, but its continual undercurrent in American society best de-
fines the context and develops the motivations of the period.  The assumption that racism is static 
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in the United States and can equally describe a shared history between African Americans, Na-
tive Americans and Japanese Americans fails to understand how each were presented as threats.  
The easiest disconnect in this concept is between anti-Japanese racism and the concept of ‘yel-
low peril.’  Numerous historians such as Roger Daniels, Gary Okihiro and Erika Lee present an 
indistinguishable connection between ‘yellow peril’ and racism toward Japanese Americans.  
Although Lee recognizes the importance of ‘yellow peril’ transnationalism as a connection be-
tween the United States and North America as a whole, the specific prejudice differences be-
tween Japanese Americans and other Asian races cannot be understated.  In fact, the differences 
should be explored so that the anti-Japanese movement and its ultimate success - or failure if un-
derstood in a different light - can be examined from its unique racial development that focused 
on the challenge of Imperial Japan to Eurocentric ideas.  Differentiation of these two concepts, 
‘yellow peril’ and the anti-Japanese movement, is necessary in identifying the importance of race 
but how it related to military concerns.  It was not only unrealized ‘yellow peril’ fears but a mix-
ture of race, nationalistic ideas, culture and loyalty that presented baseless arguments of intern-
ment.   
 The Japanese race, as a singularly homogenous group, was understood to be the concern 
by men like Homer Lea and Alfred Mahan during the late 1890s and into the 1910s.  They at-
tached the ideas of threat, specifically of an ‘invasion,’ with Japanese because they could not 
separate their misunderstandings of Japanese culture and their race.  This culture included, in 
their mind, a complete dedication to an Imperial Japanese state that was a burgeoning military 
power in the Pacific.  Ideas of culture and nationalism intertwined with race to formulate a Japan 
dangerous to America’s Pacific interests and a Japanese people complacent and willing to sup-
port Japan’s Imperial ambitions.  Other writers like Peter Kyne and James Abbott questioned the 
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loyalty and assimilability of Japanese Americans.  They too argued that as a race, Japanese as a 
transnational group were a military threat and advocated for limits on immigration and restricting 
the liberties of Japanese Americans.  Politicians carried this ideology to their legislative positions 
with the promotion of legalized prejudice against Japanese Americans.  Men like James Phelan 
and WR Sharkey supported this repressive consensus on Japanese American citizens they con-
sidered parallel to their racial risks to national security.  The assumed Japanese American 
method of anti-American activity, ‘invasion,’ began to be replaced in the 1930s by fifth column 
activity.  The United States military, including leadership and intelligence, found significant con-
cern in Japanese Americans consistent throughout the interwar period.  No change in terminol-
ogy affected attitudes on Japanese American racism or national risk.  These numerous individu-
als represented a vast American society rampant with anti-Japanese ides and powerful connec-
tions to political and military authority.  In fact, this movement of uniquely and powerfully 
placed individuals were ideally positioned to convey a consensus American view opposed to Jap-
anese Americans. 
 These well-respected individuals were intent on connecting their misgivings towards Jap-
anese Americans with the necessity of military action.  General DeWitt may have taken national 
security measures that he and the government deemed necessary for protection but he only struck 
the match of the bonfire built on decades of prejudice.  Military necessity was borne out of the 
anti-Japanese movement and came to placate the racially driven expectations of a panicked pop-
ulation in 1942.  The true nature of Japanese ‘invasion’ or Japanese American fifth column activ-
ity was enhanced by decades of rhetoric which supplemented reality with imagination and even 
lies.  The government used this to incriminate Japanese Americans by placing them at the en-
emy’s disposal at Pearl Harbor and along the shores of the American West Coast.  The result was 
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the ideas of Lea, Abbott and James Phelan coming to fruition.  Imperial Japan had bombed Pearl 
Harbor but it had been a complete effort by the Japanese race.  By signing Exclusive Order 9066 
the United States verified the success of the anti-Japanese movement and the presumed militant 
nature of the Japanese race. 
 In reality the United States did not recognize aggressive Nazi German fifth column activ-
ity against the United States as race driven as they did with Imperial Japan.  They further identi-
fied Japanese American in Hawaii under a different set of rules expedient to political and eco-
nomic needs, not supposed military necessity.    These examples refute arguments of Japanese 
Americans internment necessity.  Yet, that is understandable as necessity did not exist but simply 
attempted to justify long held beliefs toward Japanese American minorities.  Military necessity 
played the final role in Japanese American internment by calling on the highest authority to face 
what was deemed unprecedented times.  It required the removal of basic rights to counter threats 
insurmountable without their infringement.  It failed to see Japanese Americans as citizens but 
instead as the enemy. 
 Although few in the academic field argue to the contrary, there remains a need to reaffirm 
the danger of wide sweeping military authority, even during times of war or significant national 
turmoil.  Eric Muller in American Inquisition appropriates Western Defense Commands unwa-
vering assessment of Japanese Americans as disloyal throughout the Second World War to un-
willingness to surrender authority during a time of war.  He further argued that if Japanese 
Americans had been released in significant numbers during the conflict as ‘loyal’ it would under-
mine the broad military rights they had secured during the conflict.260  A substantial goal of 
Michelle Malkin’s book, In Defense of Internment, attempted to excuse continued undemocratic 
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practices including internment against Muslims after the September 11, 2001 attacks by relating 
them to Japanese American internment and a need for security.  As such, her thesis attempts to 
indicate a certain admissibility of civil liberties prudent to protection of the Union.  Citizens’ 
rights, in other words, cannot supersede the sanctity of government authority when deemed nec-
essary to maintain the democracy itself.261   
 Much like the continual racism prevalent in American history, debate on the role and lim-
its of wartime government authority and its intersection with civil liberties has yet to reach an 
equilibrium either.  Anti-Japanese racism describes the risks of prejudice that can mold citizens 
into military enemies through deliberate and calculated fear based rhetoric.  Their internment 
was the result of these racial assumptions which withdraw rights out of convenience disguised as 
necessity.  In the year that followed the conclusion of the American Civil War, the Supreme 
Court ruled on the legality of military tribunals during times of war.  Although that case was not 
relevant to this study, a statement from Justice David Davis in Ex parte Milligan is.  Davis stated 
that “The Constitution is not made for peace alone, it is made for war as well as peace.  It is not 
merely for fair weather.  The real test of its power and authority, the real test of its strength to 
protect the minority, arises only when it has to be construed in times of stress.”262  The study of 
Japanese American internment supports that only a single stressor is needed to remove Constitu-
tional rights of minorities.  Efforts to make Japanese Americans an antagonist in the decades 
prior to the stressor of World War II was the needed undercurrent. 
 Japanese American internment during World War II places the worst attributes of the 
United States on display.  The anti-Japanese movement’s prejudice and its creation of military 
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concerns toward citizens highlights how undemocratic measures can grow within democratic 
ideals.  In 1943 President Roosevelt addressed the creation of an all Japanese American combat 
unit, later to be known as the 442 Infantry Regiment.  His message aspired to those ideas, stating, 
“no loyal citizen of the United States should be denied the democratic right to excursive his citi-
zenship, regardless of his ancestry.  The principle on which this country was founded any which 
it has always been governed is that Americanism is a matter of the mind and heart; Americanism 
is not, and never was, a matter of race or ancestry.  A good American is one who is loyal to this 
country and to our creed of liberty and democracy.”263  Although President Roosevelt’s actions 
verified his lack of faith and adherence to the high morality of his own statement, the essence of 
his message certainly depicts the high calling of democracy and its inherent equality.   For Japa-
nese Americans during the Second World War these words were hollow visions as it was indeed 
race and not citizenship that had dictated their internment.  They had not been given the oppor-
tunity to demonstrate their loyalty or to show their Americanism.  Their hearts and minds were 
presumed devoted to Imperial Japan in the form of military threat.  The true menace however 
had not been Japanese Americans, but instead the anti-Japanese movement and its ability to 
again show how racial prejudice can be a weapon in American minority history.   
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